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Taiwan People Party’s potential for policy-making influence is significant, especially in contested areas like national defense and cross-strait relations.
When Taiwan’s President-elect Lai Ching-te takes office in May, he will face multiple challenges that his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, did not have to deal with before – a divided government, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) winning the presidency but losing the majority of the legislature to the Kuomintang (KMT), as well as a legislature whose productivity in passing laws lies partially in the hands of the minority Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
Lai’s election means that his party, the DPP, will serve a third consecutive term in the presidency, and it will be the first time a party has secured a third term in Taiwan since 1996. But the DPP also lost control of the Legislative Yuan to the Kuomintang (KMT) party and, since neither party won an absolute majority, the TPP’s ‘crucial minority’ will hold significant sway over the direction of the Legislative Yuan.
While this election may indeed represent a new dynamic in Taiwan’s political atmosphere, in which the TPP, an alternative to traditional two-party politics, has gained traction, the practical realities remain uncertain.
Both DPP and KMT members have voiced aversions to cooperating with the emerging party, sparking fears of a series of deadlocks in the coming Legislative Yuan session. The question therefore becomes how much the two dominant parties need the TPP – and vice versa – in order to exert any substantial influence in the next four years.
The TPP’s Potential for Policymaking Influence
While critics call Ko and his TPP idealistic and not grounded in practical ideology outside of claiming to be ‘alternative,’ the party’s strong performance in January, especially among young voters, suggests an appetite in Taiwan for representation beyond the traditional green and blue poles.
Still, the TPP does not take a clear stance on certain major domestic and foreign policy issues, meaning that it could swing either way when the time comes for the legislature to vote. The party could be particularly influential on heavily contested policy areas where it touts itself as a ‘middle ground’, including national defence and cross-strait relations.
Ko has voiced support for raising Taiwan’s arms budget from its current 2.6% to 3% – a number far beyond the 2% that NATO members are required to invest, for instance. This support reflects the island’s confrontation with the growing threat that it faces from Beijing, and its efforts to maintain deterrence through both military and diplomatic methods. Ko has criticised the DPP and KMT in the past for their more ‘extreme’ stances on relations with China, now calling for strong national defence while also increasing efforts to maintain peace with Beijing.
In terms of international relations, the TPP’s legislators could play key roles influencing major policy decisions onTaiwan’s strategy of parliamentary diplomacy, especially given the significant disparity in cross-strait policy between the DPP and the KMT. The TPP presents itself as “being grounded in the broader consensus of all Taiwanese”, critiquing the DPP and KMT for taking more extreme diplomatic stances. Practically, though, TPP’s position in the legislaturemay teeter in between both parties enough to be able to swing one side or the other when the time comes to vote on policies regarding Taiwan’s security and foreign relations.
Nonetheless, the TPP sometimes picks a clear side. For instance, on the issue of food safety in Taiwan, the TPP’s policies align with those of the KMT. Nonetheless, the TPP may encounter obstacles in influencing parliamentary decisions if the KMT chooses not to collaborate.
View of the TPP Outside of Taiwan
The TPP’s emergence as a powerful force in Taiwanese politics has also captured the attention of Taiwan’s allies abroad.
According to a report by the Diplomat, Ko’s approach to relations with both China and the U.S. is “flexible,” aiming to balance “the stimuli produced by Washington and Beijing” while looking for Taiwan’s de facto autonomy and maximizing national interests.
The European Union (EU)’s stance on Taiwan is more fragmented and less straightforward. It is less likely to have significantly strong preferences across the Union when it comes to the outcome of the elections, so long as the outcome includes a democratic, free and open election. Several European commentators pointed to the lower turnout, the emergence of the TPP and the lower stakes of the election as signifiers of a certain ‘maturity’ in Taiwanese democracy, transcending existential elections but also bipartisanship toward greater plurality and diversification.
Relatedly, democracies around the world can also stand to learn from these elections and Taiwan’s monumental efforts against information manipulation throughout: Taiwan’s expertise in this regard provides a unique front for collaboration within democratic societies such as the EU that are increasingly affronted by information manipulation.
TPP’s Support of KMT Conveners
While the TPP’s eight seats may appear pivotal in decisive moments, their significance may diminish without cross-party cooperation in the parliament. In a worst-case scenario, a lack of proactive engagement by the TPP with either the KMT or the DPP could precipitate a hung parliament, stymieing legislative progress on pivotal issues.
Recent developments, however, hint at the TPP’s inclination toward one of the major parties, potentially averting such a scenario. In the convener elections, both the incumbent DPP and the primary opposition KMT secured eight seats each in the eight legislative committees, with the TPP throwing its weight behind KMT candidates.
The TPP’s endorsement of KMT candidates and public displays of solidarity by KMT members underscored the strategic alliances and political dynamics within Taiwan’s legislature.
Strategically sound yet risky, the TPP’s collaboration with the opposition party necessitates a delicate balance, as it strives to maintain its purported political independence while making decisions aligned with its principles. But opposition party cooperation materializes only when issues at hand serve the shared interests of the TPP and the KMT on domestic policy fronts. Their cooperation may falter once these interests diverge.
Take, for instance, the debate surrounding defence and the arms budget. While both the incumbent DPP and the TPP advocate for a budget increase to counter potential threats across the Taiwan Strait, the KMT advocates for budget reductions.
For TPP lawmakers, navigating primary issues and policies demands nuanced collaboration with both the KMT and the DPP and this cooperation will need to reciprocal, if the TPP is to have pathway for influence. Overally, though,the TPP’s presence has charted a ‘third way’ in policy making, dismantling the longstanding dichotomy of the two-party rivalry.
Looking ahead, the TPP must balance its role as a minority opposition party overseeing the new government with pragmatic cooperation within the parliament, ensuring legislative outcomes reflect the will of their electorate and the broader Taiwanese populace.
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TNL Editor (@thenewslensintl)
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