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Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s president-elect, at an election night rally outside the Democratic Progressive Party headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan, on Saturday, Jan. 13, 2024. (An Rong Xu/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
In a result that’s sure to displease Beijing, Taiwan recently elected an independence-leaning candidate for president. That would naturally seem like good news for the US, but in this op-ed, longtime China analyst Dean Cheng says an examination of other ballots — and geopolitical crises thousands of miles away — leave plenty for Washington to worry about.
With both the presidential and legislative election results now in, the 2024 Taiwan election cycles clearly presage major potential tensions for American security concerns in the Pacific for the rest of the year.
The combination of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victory in the Taiwan presidential election and uncertainty about how the Taiwanese legislature will be managed raises the potential for real gridlock, at a time when Beijing has already indicated that it is unhappy with the political results.
Potential uncertainty in Taiwan’s defense budget, in the face of likely increased Chinese military provocations, could lead to miscalculation or even a full-blown crisis.
A strong American response would help deter and dissuade Beijing, but ever-expanding demands on American resources, especially munitions, further exacerbates the situation, as it raises questions about fundamental credibility and sustainability of any American reaction.
Taiwan Election Results
As has been widely reported, the DPP scored an unprecedented third presidential term in office, as their candidate William Lai won a plurality of the vote, at 40.1 percent. The Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT) came in second, at 33.5 percent, while the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) scored some 26.5 percent.
For many outsiders, this result is interpreted as Taiwanese voters defying the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The DPP is widely seen as the more pro-independence political party, and has long garnered the ire of the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing had been pressing Taiwanese voters to reject the DPP and warning about the potential for conflict. Indeed, in the wake of the election, Chinese spokespeople warned that Taiwan remained China’s Taiwan.
Though China looms large, it is important to recognize that, in fact, the Taiwan elections were as much about domestic concerns, including economic and social issues, as it was about cross-Straits relations. The DPP is generally on the more progressive end of the political spectrum on many of these issues. Several preelection polls indicated voter dissatisfaction with DPP handling of the Taiwan economy, and while Lai won a plurality, his 40 percent suggests that he does not have an overwhelming mandate. This should temper any effort to alter the island’s situation but may also be seen in Beijing as reflecting weakness and vulnerability — therefore inviting even more provocations by Beijing.
The potential volatility of the island’s political scene is underscored by the legislative results of the Saturday elections. No party emerged with a majority in the 113 seat Legislative Yuan (LY). Instead, the DPP, which had previously held a majority, won 51 seats, while the KMT won 52. The TPP took eight seats, while independents won two. This means that the TPP now has the potential of playing power broker, as its eight seats would be sufficient to forge a majority with either the DPP or the KMT.
It is unclear, however, how the TPP is likely to align. While it describes itself as a center-left party, the TPP’s leadership appeared far more open to joining the KMT than the DPP. But in negotiations prior to the election, the TPP and KMT were unable to coalesce to counter the DPP.
Who controls the LY, in turn, will have enormous say in Taiwan’s defense budget and acquisitions. In the past, when power was divided between a DPP presidency and KMT-controlled LY, defense acquisitions became a political football, with delays on appropriating funding for key weapons systems. This could become even more complicated, as the TPP’s stance on relations with China differs from both the KMT and the DPP. It is therefore unclear what kinds of demands the TPP might make if it were to forge a coalition with either party to control the LY’s agenda.
Given major ongoing acquisitions including domestically produced diesel-electric submarines (the first of which was launched last year) and F-16 C/Ds, disruptions in the defense budget process could impose both delays and supply chain interruptions. Given the PRC’s unhappiness with the result, such volatility in defense acquisitions would further erode the stability of the Taiwan Straits.
Challenges For The United States
The DPP victory in the Taiwan presidential race, and the uncertainties for the LY leadership, also raise serious challenges for the United States. The United States remains the key factor in enabling deterrence across the Taiwan Straits. But ongoing security developments around the world, coupled with growing tensions in the US-China relationship, are liable to raise questions about the credibility and viability of that deterrent, especially if Beijing chooses to escalate tensions such as through renewed missile tests or aerial intrusions.
This is exacerbated by the growing concerns about the American defense supply chains.
Even before the election, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict had stretched US military resources. Defense authorities have noted that there are unprecedented demands for a range of American-made munitions, from Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles and Switchblade anti-tank missiles to 155mm artillery shells.
The eruption of conflict in the Red Sea, however, now directly pressures a key American weapon: the SM-2 Standard surface-to-air missile. The SM-2 is one of the key weapons for the backbone of the US Navy’s surface combatant fleet: the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. They are the main weapon for engaging anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and manned aircraft. These have been used to down a number of Houthi missiles aimed at shipping in the Red Sea.
The challenge, in part, is that many nations also use the SM-2. Allies using variants of the SM-2 include Canada, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and Spain. Notably, Taiwan’s four Kee Lung-class destroyers, formerly the American Kidd-class, use the SM-2 as well. Most of these nations are dependent upon Raytheon to produce both initial and follow-on load-outs of these weapons.
More worrisome, the experience in the Ukraine conflict is that modern warfare is voracious logistically. Consumption demands for all munitions are far higher than peacetime production rates. Both Russia and Ukraine have fired tens of thousands of artillery shells, and expended hundreds of UAVs. In the event of a Taiwan Straits crisis, much less a full-blown Chinese invasion of the island, expenditures of air defense missiles such as the SM-2 to counter Chinese UAVs, aircraft, and ballistic missiles are likely to dwarf the usage rates seen thus far.
For Taiwan’s navy, the availability of SM-2s is likely to be a key determinant in the survivability of its forces. But that will also be true for the United States; any effort to intervene will certainly entail naval as well as aerial power projection. Given China’s vast array of air-launched anti-ship systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles, UAVs, and ship-launched anti-surface weapons, being able to fill and refill Taiwanese and American magazines will be a key part of any joint defense effort.
As important, demonstrating the ability to sustain US support will play a key role in deterring overt Chinese action against the island or its extended sea lanes of communications.
Gearing Up The Supply Chains?
The Secretary of the Navy, Carlos del Toro, has already called for convening yet another study about strengthening the American defense industrial base. But while there are certainly measures that could be undertaken to improve and streamline acquisitions, a clear and simple step is to expand production of current munitions. Of particular importance should be those systems that are used by a variety of American allies.
Common weapons simplify logistics, but it also means that the ability to meet demand for these systems faces obvious bottlenecks. Given ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and the potential for substantially increased tensions in the East and South China Sea, expanding production of a weapon common to both European and Asian allies should not require a multi-year study.
Should Taiwan’s LY be able to build a consensus for maintaining and even improving its defense acquisitions, it is incumbent upon the American industrial base to be able to meet the need.
Dean Cheng, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a senior advisor on China at the United States Institute of Peace.
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