The Beijing Talks between China’s President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s Former President Ma Ying-jeou ― A Strategy to Utilize Public Opinion in China on Taiwan List of Articles

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On April 10, 2024, Prime Minister Kishida visited the United States to hold the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Biden. Partly due to the high level of attention on this summit meeting, the talks held on the same day between China’s President Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, the former president of Taiwan then visiting Beijing, went largely unreported in the Japanese media. The talks between President Xi and former president Ma have been variously characterized as a choreographed performance of reconciliation between China and Taiwan and as an attempt to contain the impact of the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held the same day and the coming inauguration of President Lai Ching-te on May 20.[1]

This article will consider how the Chinese authorities reported on the talks between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou within China and will examine their strategy to utilize public opinion within China on the issue of Taiwan and the impact of this strategy on Japan.

Media reporting on the speech by President Xi Jinping

The Xinhua News Agency is China’s national news agency, under the direct control of the State Council. Its priority mission is to faithfully fulfill its responsibility as the spokesperson, eyes, ears, and think tank of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), always promoting and reporting the thought and image of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping.[2] On April 11, the day after the talks between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, the Xinhua News Agency published an article in the Chinese language edition titled “The Keynote Speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping Indicates the Correct Direction of Cross-Strait Relations and Encourages Compatriots on Both Sides of the Strait to Work Together to Pioneer a Bright Future.”[3]

The gist of the article was to present, as the words of the people of Taiwan, repeated expression of the great history of the Chinese people, the goodwill of mainland China towards Taiwan, the development of the mainland, and the attitude that “Taiwanese independence would run counter to the correct flow of history.” This was done by making the Taiwanese university students who had accompanied Ma Ying-jeou on his visit to the mainland and Taiwanese students studying at universities in China recount their impressions of President Xi Jinping’s speech. With additional quotes from Chinese researchers into Taiwan and Taiwanese party leaders, the article was structured as if the words of these Taiwanese students actually represented mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.

“Popular perception” in Taiwan, as related by two party leaders

The use of commentary by university professors and other experts to reinforce the objectivity of personal opinion is a practice that can often be observed in the Japanese media, to present this opinion as the common perception of a social majority or the general public. The Xinhua News Agency article uses a similar technique. However, in this case, it is important to note the backgrounds of the experts put forward to comment on popular perception in Taiwanese society: Wu Rong-yuan, chairman of the Taiwan Labor Party, and Qi Jialin, chairman of the Alliance for the Reunification of China.

China has eight political parties in addition to the CCP, including the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (or KMT Revolutionary Committee)[4] and the Taiwan Democratic Autonomy League.[5] These minor political parties can be characterized as non-oppositional or satellite parties of the CCP. They participate in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference under the direction of the CCP.[6] Therefore, for the general populous on the Chinese mainland, who have no special knowledge of Taiwanese affairs, the two parties represented in the Xinhua News Agency article may appear as if they were non-oppositional parties aligned with the Taiwanese government authorities: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or perhaps the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). At least, given general perceptions within mainland Chinese society, the words of these “party leaders” would be viewed as a reflection of the will of the Taiwanese government authorities. For Chinese nationals familiar with the affairs of Taiwan and its jumbled assortment of political parties — the DPP, KMT, Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), etc. — they would be viewed as the opinions of a political force which, although presenting a different perspective to the governing DPP, still has a certain degree of — albeit minority — support within Taiwanese society: something close to an opposition party.

However, these two party leaders are definitely not considered representatives of Taiwanese society within the society itself. Neither political party has any material impact on Taiwanese politics. In fact, in the Legislative Yuan elections held together with the presidential election in January 2024, not even one Legislative Yuan member was elected from either the Taiwan Labor Party or the Alliance for the Reunification of China.[7] Even below the level of the Legislative Yuan, the national parliament, these two political parties have virtually no influence in terms of electing the heads of local government or members of regional legislatures. The only such member that could be confirmed was one member of the Hsinchu County legislature from the Taiwan Labor Party.[8] Neither party has an official Internet homepage.[9] The way that the article presents the words of these representatives of political groups — purportedly political parties but with virtually no popular support — as if they spoke for the Taiwanese populous is clearly propaganda. Articles such as these use the classic techniques of public opinion warfare and psychological warfare against readers within China.

Security risks created by China’s propaganda against its own people

A huge gap exists between Taiwan as presented to the Chinese people by the Chinese authorities through state-controlled media such as its national news agency and Taiwan in the real world. It is quite clear that Ma Ying-jeou, the former president of Taiwan, no longer enjoys the support of many KMT supporters, let alone the majority of Taiwanese society. For example, on the eve of the presidential election, Ma commented in an interview with German media that “we should trust President Xi Jinping.” It is only recently that the presidential candidates — not only from the DPP and TPP but also from the KMT that Ma himself supports — all expressed their opposition to Ma’s comment.[10]

The Chinese authorities reported on the results of Taiwan’s presidential and Legislative Yuan elections by claiming that “these election results prove that the DPP does not represent mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.”[11] However, it is no uncommon occurrence in Japan, the United States, and other democratic societies for the president or head of a political party to be at odds with the leading party in the parliament. It is more appropriate to view the results of the recent Taiwanese elections as a decision by the Taiwanese populous to maintain the status quo: a rejection of both independence and unification with China. This is completely different from the image of Taiwan that China’s authorities seek to present to the Chinese people.

A cognitive gap has been created between Taiwan in the eyes of the Chinese people and Taiwan in reality, through propaganda operations such as these by the Chinese authorities. This gap gives rise to a misconception among the Chinese populous that the more the Chinese authorities emphasize their view, the closer the day of reunification with Taiwan. When the Chinese people realize the size of this cognitive gap — that their expectations of unification have been betrayed — will the brunt of their anger be directed at Taiwan, or the Chinese authorities? Either result would clearly threaten not only Japan’s national security environment but also the peace and stability of the international community.

(2024/6/28)

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