Report

America Prepares for a Pacific War With China It Doesn’t Want

Embedded with U.S. forces in the Pacific, I saw the dilemmas of deterrence firsthand.

A view from the cockpit shows backlit control panels and two pilots inside a KC-130J aerial refueler en route from Williamtown to Darwin as the sun sets on the horizon.

A view from the cockpit shows a KC-130J aerial refueler en route from Williamtown, Australia, to Darwin at sunset on July 12. Zuri Linetsky for Foreign Policy

Flying over the Australian Outback at night in a U.S. Marine Corps KC-130J aerial refueler, the scene outside the cockpit is a featureless sea of black. The instrument panels are backlit in neon green. The radio crackles in my ear over the baritone drone of the aircraft’s four propellers. Lt. Col. Courtney O’Brien (call sign Britney) alerts me to two fighter planes approaching from the rear. The KC-130J deploys fuel lines from tanks on both wings as incoming Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II fighter jets extend their fuel probes to begin aerial refueling.

Flying over the Australian Outback at night in a U.S. Marine Corps KC-130J aerial refueler, the scene outside the cockpit is a featureless sea of black. The instrument panels are backlit in neon green. The radio crackles in my ear over the baritone drone of the aircraft’s four propellers. Lt. Col. Courtney O’Brien (call sign Britney) alerts me to two fighter planes approaching from the rear. The KC-130J deploys fuel lines from tanks on both wings as incoming Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II fighter jets extend their fuel probes to begin aerial refueling.

I watch as digital displays on five fuel gauges slowly tick down from 50,000 pounds to just under 20,000. As the F-35C’s disconnect and drop away, a core challenge to U.S. strategic objectives across the Pacific theater comes into focus. To operate across this vast region and prepare for a potential conflict with near-peer competitors, the U.S. military needs shrewd solutions for complex logistical puzzles of time and distance.

Ensuring the Indo-Pacific region remains “free and open” is the primary strategic objective of the Biden administration. It seeks to protect the law of the sea, maintain open sea lanes and the free flow of seaborne trade, and resist coercion against Taiwan. To this end, the United States is working to ensure its military capacities can be intermingled with local allies and partners in “integrated deterrence.” This requires sustaining forces thousands of miles from the United States, sitting at the end of intricate supply chains that China has every interest in breaking.

It’s not just that the mission is far away; the theater itself is enormous. Nearly 6,000 miles lay between the U.S. military bases in San Diego and Iwakuni, Japan—more than twice the distance from Washington to Los Angeles. The United States and its allies need to minimize travel time and maximize the time their forces can remain deployed in forward areas.

This requires systems for moving and using fuel, weapons, and other critical supplies, for repairing equipment, and for setting up and maintaining bases. Moving U.S. military personnel and equipment from Australia toward the Chinese coast, for example, requires traveling more than 5,000 miles through Indonesia, the Philippines, and on toward the Taiwan Strait. It can require aerial refueling or airstrips to land on with prepositioned fuel, ordnance, and other supplies.

But these supply chains can be perceived as offensive provocations by China. The United States accumulating access to new airfields and military bases and building up partner military forces it can integrate with seamlessly feeds into Chinese narratives that China is being contained by the United States. I saw this firsthand.

This July, I embedded for a week with a Marine Corps F-35C squadron nicknamed the “Black Knights.”  I observed them conduct bilateral training with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and participate in a bilateral exercise with the Philippine Armed Forces during Marine Aviation Support Activity 2023. I watched the Black Knights, elements of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force to which they belong test features of new logistical systems for distributed maritime operations.

Their systems are thoughtful and sophisticated—but at the same time as deterring China in the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific, they may also risk provoking it.

A U.S. Marine watches as an F-35 Lightning fighter jet lands on a runway in the Philippines. Behind the plane is grass and a low building.

A U.S. Marine watches as an F-35 fighter jet lands during a joint military exercise at Subic Bay in the Philippines on July 13. Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images

On a sunbathed Monday morning, I arrived at the RAAF Base in Williamtown. The base is about 9 miles north of Newcastle, a renowned coal-producing town on the east coast of New South Wales. I was escorted through base security by my host, Lt. Col. Michael O’Brien (call sign Snooki), the commanding officer of the Black Knights and one of the primary fixed-wing aircraft planners for Force Design 2030, the Pacific-orientated strategy for the Marines. (O’Brien retired from the Marines in August, after 20 years of service, and is now running for Congress in Pennsylvania.)

At Williamtown, the Black Knights operate out of a pristine two-story hanger. The hanger is part of a complex of buildings servicing two Australian F-35A squadrons. While the RAAF operates the land-based F-35A, the Black Knights fly the land- or aircraft carrier-based F-35C. The planes are outside, parked in columns under awnings to protect their delicate skin from the elements. The contours of the plane’s design, the metal composite of its panels and parts, and the radar-absorbent material coating the entire jet contribute to its low observability—its stealth. The awnings have power hookups and are Wi-Fi-enabled, allowing mechanical crews to download data from the plane to guide their maintenance work. Snooki’s executive officer, Maj. Derek Heinz (call sign Shootsbe, who left the Black Knights on terminal leave in August to work for Delta while completing his military service with the Marine Reserves), told me the aircraft is essentially several computers, with a pilot managing the plane’s systems along for the ride.

The U.S. and Australian aircraft trained together in the air twice a day while their staffs worked closely on the ground. RAAF No. 3 Squadron Wing Commander Adrian Kiely (call sign Kenny) said he trusts Marine F-35 maintenance crews to conduct unsupervised work on his aircraft. And when a 270-volt battery in a Black Knight F-35C stopped working, Kenny’s squad provided the component from one of their out-of-service aircraft.

The contours of the plane’s design, the metal composite of its panels and parts, and the radar-absorbent material coating the entire jet contribute to its low observability—its stealth.

Aircraft maintainers for the Black Knights noted that they could have procured a spare engine or munitions from the Australians if it had been necessary because of the similar aircraft systems. One said that if getting a component from the Aussies didn’t limit their ability to fight, the Marines could have any part they needed. They would then backfill it.

In this case, though, the battery could not be easily procured through the global spares pool. Kenny noted that challenges remain with the sufficiency of spares. In his view, the solution is still “maturing.” But he and Snooki demonstrated an ability and willingness to work toward solutions regarding spare parts at the unit level.

During their training at Williamtown, the Black Knights tested new systems as well. They are the first Marine fighter squadron to use Elon Musk’s Starlink internet system to log data from their aircraft computers to the Defense Department’s cloud-based logistics system. Snooki and his staff reported that the commercial Starlink system the Marines are using while they wait for a hardened version for forward operations is better than the legacy Marine option. But it was dropped at some point on their way to Australia, and the hardware did not function when they arrived at Williamtown.

The Black Knights deployed to the Pacific alongside other units working with U.S. allies and partners. The “Death Rattlers,” an F/A-18 Hornet squadron, were in the Philippines for Marine Aviation Support Activity 2023. Other Marines, including Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, were deployed in Darwin, Australia; Micronesia; Papua New Guinea; and Palau. The Marines I met were curious, funny, and content to be forward deployed. While they enjoyed their down time, they are hyper-focused on their tasks. They swarm aircraft, working like a coordinated hive.

All of these forward-deployed Marines were under the command and control of Brig. Gen. Robert Brodie (call sign Bams), a career F/A-18 pilot, to, among other objectives, test the systems that make up Force Design 2030.

The Marines, like every branch of the U.S. military, are working to counter China’s anti-access/area denial capability—the use of long- and short-range precision-guided missiles to prevent opposing militaries from operating freely within a predetermined bubble around China’s coastline. Chinese missiles are currently able to target the first island chain, including Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia, about 800 miles from China’s coast. Their range is growing to encompass the second island chain as well—a line connecting Japan’s Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands (including Guam), the Caroline Islands, and Western New Guinea, about 1,800 miles from China. Most concerningly for the United States and its allies, this emboldens China to act aggressively in the Pacific because it provides an umbrella of protection for its military forces.

The Chinese missile force is currently capable of attacking and destroying U.S. air bases in Japan—including, among others, Kadena Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni—and is growing to include Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. According to Rand Corp. calculations, even if one-third of Chinese cruise missiles targeting aircraft hangers and open-air parking at Andersen missed or were shot down, a barrage of 53 missiles could incapacitate the base. And stationary air defenses and aircraft can be targeted and destroyed by only a few precision-guided munitions.

For the Marines to get close to China and fight, they must be able to operate within range of China’s missiles. To achieve this, Force Design 2030 conceptualizes a distributed forward operating system, operationalized through hubs, spokes, and nodes.

For the Marines to get close to China and fight, they must be able to operate within range of China’s missiles.

This system divides Marine forces into smaller elements, distributes them at multiple locations, and sustains forward operations using pre-positioned supplies. This new system faces dire wargame projections. In a war with China over Taiwan, in the most likely “base” scenario, the United States could lose between 168 and 372 aircraft, several submarines would be destroyed, and up to 20 surface ships (including as many as two aircraft carriers) would be damaged or destroyed. China would lose more than 160 planes and as many as 140 surface ships. Both sides would deplete their long-range missile stockpiles. And at least 40,000 Chinese military personnel would die, according to one scenario. The United States could run out of sea- and land-based missiles within two weeks of fighting.

The Marine Corps is making its bases and forces more survivable. It is increasing the number of targets that Chinese rockets must hit and the number of rockets each target will require to incapacitate.

“Hubs” are the largest element in the new Marine forward operating concept. They are permanent sites where the U.S. and allied militaries have a higher level of supply and command and control capability. The Williamtown base is an example of a hub for both U.S. and Australian F-35s.

Immediately beyond a hub are “spokes”—forward bases within China’s missile range with a small temporary military presence. They rely on existing infrastructure, including airfields.

The last layer is the temporary “node.” A node has no personnel presence and likely lacks existing infrastructure. A node can be temporarily stood up in a forward area. Supplies for sustaining forward operating units can be pre-positioned at nodes, including fuel and weapons or airfield quick repair equipment. When needed, personnel arrive, stand up the node, use it, and then move on.