Book review: Strait talk about Taiwan – 台北時報 Feedzy

Simplified bargaining theory model lays out various paths toward conflict in Taiwan Strait and how they can be avoided

By James Baron / Contributing reporter

How likely is war in the Taiwan Strait? What kind of conflict might it be? What circumstances would be most likely to trigger it? And how can these circumstances be averted? These are the central questions of this penetrating and perspicuous work.

Having examined various aspects of cross strait relations and tensions in the book’s first half, which includes chapters on economic integration, military disparities, the role of the US, and domestic dynamics in Taiwan and China, author Scott L Kastner presents a “highly simplified” model based on bargaining theories of conflict used by scholars of international relations. Most notably, he draws on James D Fearon’s influential 1995 paper “Rationalist Explanations for War,” in which the Stanford political scientist examines “the inefficiency puzzle of war” — namely the reasons why wars occur even when peace would be more beneficial for all parties.

Through this lens — or “baseline,” as he calls it — Kastner analyses the various potential sparks of a conflagration. He is at pains to stress that the model “necessarily ignores a range of factors that could serve as explanations for war.”

Chief among the omissions from the model are a possible cultural propensity for belligerence on the part of certain societies and the whims of “irrational and impulsive” leaders. In Taiwan’s case, this latter element could be crucial. Susan L Shirk — who Kastner quotes twice in this book — underlines this point in Overreach, which I previously reviewed in these pages: In Xi Jinping (習近平), we currently have a Chinese leader who is less predictable and less circumscribed in his decision-making than any other since Mao Zedong (毛澤東).

Nevertheless, Kastner presents strong arguments for using a stripped-down representation of the variables. Firstly, he contends that the more complex a reality is, the greater benefit there is in abstracting away from it with a simplified model. Using the example of maps, he notes that, conversely, “the more closely a map replicates that which it aims to represent, the less useful it becomes.” For example, a subway map that is “cluttered with detailed information on every twist and turn of each line” would be self-defeating. One that added overground streets and bus routes to the mix would be even less efficient.

Moreover, the model serves a twofold purpose: First, it provides an organizational framework to analyze how the various trends in cross-strait relations fit together. Second, it has a “predictive function.” Stressing that his aim is neither to forecast the outcome of a war between Taiwan and China or to guess when it might occur, Kastner explains that his primary concern is to “understand how worried interested observers should be …”

The major concerns are subsumed under two main rubrics: attempts by Taiwan to alter the status quo in a manner that China deems unacceptable and parallel efforts by Beijing “to impose its desired sovereignty solution on Taiwan.” Kastner, a professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, refers to these two possibilities as problems of “Taiwan revisionism” versus “PRC revisionism.”

Based on the available evidence, the former potentiality — where Taipei crosses one of China’s “red lines” — is far less likely to materialize, Kastner argues. He bases this conclusion on the observation that Taiwan’s leaders and, even more so its public, have thus far demonstrated a remarkable knack for pragmatism in their approach to the red line of sovereignty.

During the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and his successor Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), there were fears in Washington that revisionist rhetoric and policies were pushing Taiwan closer to China’s threshold. Although Kastner believes that these concerns were not misplaced, he concludes that conflict scenarios were managed “relatively successfully” by Taipei, Beijing and Washington.

While Vice President William’s Lai’s (賴清德) stopover in the US en route to Paraguay earlier this month drew flak from Beijing, Kastner’s observations that “moderation continues to pay,” even for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), are valid. Reports in local and international media have pointed to an increasingly moderate tone from Lai, who is the ruling DPP’s candidate for January’s presidential election. Referring to the 2019 DPP presidential primary, Kastner notes that Lai’s pro-independence stance was toned down to the extent that it did not diverge markedly from the incumbent Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).

Several factors were (and continue to be) at play here: Beijing’s ability to credibly signal its commitment to the Taiwan issue; Washington’s willingness to discourage Taiwanese revisionism; and Taipei’s own “strong incentives to tread cautiously.” Regarding this last point, Kastner believes the “primarily symbolic nature of gains from Taiwan revisionism helps to undercut its allure to Taiwan’s domestic audience.” This, in turn makes such revisionism a political risk for Taiwanese governments.

Instead, Kastner depicts PRC revisionism as far more dangerous. A major trend in this direction, writes Kastner, is the growing imbalance of military power in the Taiwan Strait, such that Beijing may eventually conclude that military action to achieve “unification” carries an “acceptable cost.” There is the further issue of “credible commitment problems,” — also raised in conjunction with the Taiwan revisionism scenario — whereby Beijing struggles to communicate its willingness to use force and Washington and Taipei struggle to distinguish genuine resolve from bravado and bluster.

The cogency of Kastner’s arguments lies partly in the neutrality of his approach. No ethical stance is presented here – Kastner is not concerned with assigning culpability for the cross-strait standoff, and one can imagine that this might not sit well with some readers. Critics may well read moral equivalency into his efforts to present his analysis free from judgment but, in the end, this is what lends this book authority.

As for how looming disaster can be averted, Kastner begins his conclusion by stressing the relatively rarity of war between states and particularly conflict involving major powers. He notes the scorn that greeted a 2020 Economist headline calling Taiwan “the most dangerous place on earth,” and agrees that it was hyperbolic. The Taiwan Strait, he argues, “has been a potential flashpoint for decades” without escalating to war.

At the same time, the risks are considerable and must be addressed through military deterrence, balanced with clear signaling from Washington that it will not support any moves by Taiwan to alter the status quo or, crucially, formally secede from China. Finally, Kastner echoes Shirk in calling for a reopening of the lines of communication between Washington and Beijing. Without such rapprochement, China may believe it has little to lose from a war in the Taiwan Strait.