China Taiwan Weekly Update, July 27, 2023 – Critical Threats Project Feedzy

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: July 26 at Noon ET

The China-Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross-Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The KMT called for coordinating with the TPP during the 2024 Legislative Yuan elections, which indicates that the KMT aims to expand its ability to win legislative seats even if it loses the presidency.
The CCP’s United Front apparatus coordinated attacks on DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te’s July 4 The Wall Street Journal op-ed “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait” to reduce support for his candidacy by framing him as pro-war.
The CCP announced the creation of the National Data Bureau (NDB) in March to manage the PRC’s public and private data. The organization may serve as a coordination vehicle between the CCP’s economic and national security organs.
Higher-ranking Chinese officials decided to meet with Henry Kissinger rather than United States Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry during their recent visits to China. That higher-ranking CCP officials met with Kissinger indicates that the party will use access to CCP policy-makers as leverage to induce American policy-makers to enact the party’s preferred policy outcomes.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The KMT called for coordinating with the TPP during the 2024 Legislative Yuan elections, which indicates that the KMT aims to expand its ability to win legislative seats even if it loses the presidency. KMT Chairman Eric Chu made the call on July 23.[1] KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih’s campaign stated it did not know to what Chu was referring.[2] Hou is reluctant to endorse Chu’s call because it could signal the party lacks faith in him as their standard bearer going into the presidential and legislative elections.

Chu called for this coordination because the KMT is trailing in the presidential polls. Hou is polling 16 percentage points behind the frontrunner DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[3] One way of salvaging the upcoming election for the KMT is to aim to gain a majority in the legislative elections. The DPP currently controls 61 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan while the KMT controls 38.[4] All 113 members of the Legislative Yuan will be up for reelection during the 2024 election. Hou’s unpopularity indicates that the KMT would need a coalition to be part of a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Legislative election cooperation with the TPP is one avenue open to the KMT that could allow it to increase its representation in the Legislative Yuan even if it loses the presidential election.

The KMT and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je never agreed to run a joint presidential campaign.[5] The two parties disagree on the degree of cooperation they should engage in for legislative elections. Ko stated that any potential cooperation should “go with the flow” and remained non-committal about it potentially come to fruition in the coming months.[6] KMT Chairman Eric Chu called for coordination between the TPP and KMT when nominating their separate legislative election candidates to enhance the likelihood of defeating the DPP.[7]

Ko is lukewarm about alignment with the KMT because the KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih remains third in the polling at roughly 20 percentage points of support.[8] Ko is second in the polling at almost 28 percentage points of support while DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te is in the lead at 36 percentage points of support.[9] Ko aligning with the KMT could cause him to lose swing voters who view him as an alternative to the DPP-KMT dominated Taiwanese political structure.

Other

The CCP’s United Front apparatus coordinated attacks on DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te’s July 4 The Wall Street Journal op-ed “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait” to reduce support for his candidacy by framing him as pro-war. The United Front group All-China Taiwan Compatriot Friendship Association[10] published articles from over 50 purported representatives of Taiwanese diaspora groups that criticized the op-ed.[11] Various United Front media organs then republished the articles.[12] Many “Taiwan compatriots” quoted in the articles contended that Lai’s overture to peace was a deceitful ploy to win votes.[13] They claimed the true purpose of Lai’s op-ed was to further “Taiwan independence” and the “suppression” of China by building American support for his candidacy.[14] The quoted individuals were affiliated with groups based in countries including the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China.[15] That the coordinated United Front attacks centered the views of ostensibly non-political “Taiwan compatriot” organizations indicates the CCP sought to portray opposition to Lai as the consensus of the Taiwanese diaspora. These messages put Lai on the defensive by making him contest such criticism under the dominant but contested narrative that the election is a choice between peace and war.

The coordinated attacks differ from prior United Front responses to “provocations,” such as then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and President Tsai’s meeting with Speaker McCarthy in April 2023. Prior responses featured criticism from communities of “overseas Chinese” groups explicitly aligned with the CCP’s goal of “peaceful unification,”[16] as well as groups claiming to be from the “international community.”[17] These communities’ opinions would have less influence on Taiwanese voters compared to that of other Taiwanese due to the groups’ explicit alignment with the CCP. In this wave of attacks on Lai’s op-ed, the United Front portrayed itself as speaking for the Taiwanese diaspora. This shift could provide the CCP with leverage points to manipulate international public opinion during a crisis by using United Front groups to falsely show Taiwanese disunity.

The DPP-controlled Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) may allow limited future cross-strait exchanges to blunt domestic criticism that the party is not sufficiently engaging with China since President Tsai took office in 2016. A delegation of Chinese students visited Taiwan at the invitation of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation from July 19 to 24 after approval by the MAC. The students visited several Taiwanese universities and cultural sites before returning to China.[18] Taiwan’s MAC approved the students after rejecting several students for having ties to the United Front or being members of the CCP.[19] Several DPP legislators opposed the move.[20] Ma announced his intentions on July 24 to start a “cross-strait university principal forum” to enable higher education cross-strait exchanges.[21] Both the KMT and TPP have criticized the DPP for not engaging enough with China.[22] The KMT and TPP frame cross-strait exchanges as necessary to reduce cross-strait tensions.[23]

The DPP has previously responded to criticism of not engaging enough with China by reopening the passenger ferries between Taiwan’s Matsu and Kinmen islands and China’s Fujian Province.[24] This occurred over opposition within the DPP.[25] China previously criticized the DPP for “unilaterally restricting” restricting cross-strait exchanges and heavily urged the DPP to restart the passenger ferries.[26] The KMT had also criticized the DPP closing the ferry service and had previously called for them to be opened as Taiwan relaxed COVID-19 restrictions.[27] Lai has stated that the DPP is open to cross-strait exchanges on the basis of parity and mutual respect but does not want to engage in exchanges solely on Beijing’s terms.[28] The similar criticism facing the DPP in this situation and the subsequent decision by the party to blunt that criticism by opening up the ferry service suggests the MAC will follow a similar course of action by allowing for future limited cross-strait exchanges.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP announced the creation of the National Data Bureau (NDB) in March to manage the PRC’s public and private data. The organization may serve as a coordination vehicle between the CCP’s economic and national security organs. The NDB falls under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which deals heavily with economic planning.[29] The development of the NDB is part of the CCP’s broader effort to centralize control of the internet via the enforcement of cyber security and data norms.[30] The state-owned China United Network Communications Chairman Liu Liehong will be the first head of the NDB.[31] Liu has over thirty years of experience that culminated in leading Chinese state-owned electronics and IT companies that bridge national security and economic policy areas. He served as Deputy Director of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission while also being Deputy Head of the Cyberspace Administration of China from 2018 to 2020 before becoming Vice-Minister of Industry and Information Technology from 2020 to 2021.[32] Liu also has considerable experience with internet governance, which the CCP views as critical to national security, and advanced in July through the Cyberspace Administration of China’s renewed crackdown on “self-media.”[33]

The NDB is part of the CCP’s strategy to create a socio-economic business environment devoid of threats to the party through stronger regulations of the PRC’s internet and economy. The CCP does not view security legislation as a hindrance to attracting economic investment and economic growth. The party is willing to tolerate a business environment less attractive to foreign investment due to expansive national security laws in order to change the norms for foreign economic activity in China. The party aims to make foreign cooperation with state security services an aspect of doing business in China that foreign investors must tolerate. The CCP pursues this goal while simultaneously holding Ministry of Commerce news conferences to increase foreign investment in China.[34]

Higher-ranking Chinese officials decided to meet with Henry Kissinger rather than US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry during their recent visits to China. Kissinger met with CCP officials such as General Secretary Xi Jinping, Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, and Director of the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi.[35] Kerry met with lower-ranking officials such as Premier Li Qiang, Vice President Han Zheng, as well as Wang Yi.[36] That higher-ranking CCP officials met with Kissinger indicates that the party will use access to CCP policy-makers as leverage to induce American policy-makers to enact the party’s preferred policy outcomes.

CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office Director Wang Yi stated that the United States needed “Kissinger-style diplomatic wisdom” and should “avoid confrontation” with China.[37] This statement coupled with the CCP’s complaints of American hegemony indicate that these are two policy areas that the party aims to shift the policy positions of the United States.[38] Wang’s comments place the onus for resolving tension in Sino-American relations solely on the United States. He is pushing this message for an external American audience as well as an internal Chinese audience. The internal audience is relevant because his narrative legitimizes the CCP by exculpating the party from blame for international tension.

Wang Yi re-assumed the role of foreign minister on July 25 and will very likely serve in the role as an interim caretaker. Wang is a veteran diplomat who served as foreign minister from 2013 to 2022, and as Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director since the start of 2023. Wang’s age[39] and the length of his previous term suggest that he will not be in the role for 5 to 10 years, which is the typical length of time that officials serve in that position. The choice of a seasoned diplomat such as Wang indicates the Party’s desire to stabilize the foreign ministry and project continuity in China’s foreign relations domestically and abroad. Since the 1990s the only times officials have concurrently held the role of foreign minister and been Politburo members are during transitions between foreign ministers.[40]

Selecting Wang to replace Qin after the latter’s month-long absence indicates that the Party is still unsure of how to handle the fallout of Qin’s disappearance. Immediately after the National People’s Congress Standing Committee made the announcement, the Foreign Ministry website began quickly deleting all pages relating to Qin, but as of July 27 the page on foreign minister was still blank. This indicates that whoever oversees updating the Ministry site was not informed of Wang’s re-appointment in advance. Otherwise, they could have prepared to put up a page with information on Wang immediately after he was re-appointed so as to project continuity. The specific wording of the July 25 announcement also indicates the Party is still in the process of deciding Qin’s fate.[41] The announcement relieved Qin of his position but did not remove his Party membership.

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