[[“value”:”
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: March 14 at 5 pm ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries.
A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government.
Taiwan’s Kuomintang is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated that “peaceful reunification” remains the PRC’s basic Taiwan policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the government work report.
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.
The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.
The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain.
The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea.
The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said that the MND adopted the concept of a “first move” in February 2021. It further developed the concept after the large-scale PLA air and naval exercises around Taiwan in August 2022, which the PRC launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan.[i] The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.
Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.[ii]
The PRC is conducting dredging operations in the Liuwudian Channel near Taiwan’s Kinmen island group, possibly to facilitate the passage of PRC vessels. The Liuwudian Channel is located between Lieyu Island (known as Little Kinmen) and the islands of Dadan and Erdan, which are part of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island group. The ROC agreed in 2015 to let PRC ships pass through the Liuwudian Channel between Xiamen port on the PRC mainland and the sea even though the channel passes through Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters. The PRC did not make use of the channel after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, however. Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Chou Mei-wu said that the dredging activities were routine operations on the PRC side of the Liuwudian channel, but that the dredgers sailed through restricted and prohibited waters around Kinmen.[iii]
Retired ROC General Lee Cheng-chieh said the dredging of the channel means the PRC plans to use the waterway in the future. He said the PRC could use ships in the Liuwudian channel in the future to block military supply shipments to Taiwanese garrisons on Dadan and Erdan.[iv] Lee is a frequent commentator on foreign and military affairs whose opinions are often covered by KMT-aligned media and PRC media.[v] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said dredging vessels operating in Kinmen’s restricted waters do not constitute a “first strike” under the MND policy which authorizes Taiwan to respond with military force to enemy military incursions into its territory.[vi]
Dredging sand in Taiwan-controlled waters is one of a growing range of “gray zone” tactics the PRC uses to harass Taiwan, assert its territorial claims, and strain Taiwan’s resources and response capability.[vii]
Thousands of PRC dredgers have illegally operated in and around Taiwan’s restricted waters, including around the Kinmen and Matsu islands, for at least a decade. The dredgers usually extract sand and gravel from the seabed for use in construction projects.[viii] Taiwan’s CGA interpreted illegal dredging to be non-political profit-seeking behavior in 2020 and agreed to cooperate with the PRC to crack down on the activity.[ix] Taiwanese media and scholars were openly describing dredging activities near Taiwanese territory as “gray zone warfare tactics,” as of late 2023, however. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a law to allow Taiwan to confiscate any vessels caught illegally dredging sand in its waters.[x]
ROC National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen said the PRC’s “joint combat readiness patrols” around Taiwan are related to Taiwan’s exchanges with foreign countries. Tsai said the PRC patrols occur every 7–10 days on average and involve around 10 military aircraft and 3 to 4 naval ships. Tsai said that whenever other countries pass resolutions friendly to Taiwan, foreign vessels pass through the Taiwan Strait, or foreign dignitaries visit Taiwan, the PRC coordinates its existing regular patrols to coincide with these diplomatic events.
Tsai further said the PRC is likely to intensify its “push and pull” tactics against Taiwan before and after President-elect Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration, including military and political intimidation combined with economic incentives for Taiwanese people to further the cause of “reunification.”[xi] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said in a report to the Legislative Yuan that the PRC has stepped up “multi-front saturated gray-zone tactics” around Taiwan, including balloons, drones, and civilian vessels, along with increased patrols of military ships and planes. The MND report said the PRC aimed to “increase burdens of [Taiwan’s] naval and air forces and to obscure the existence of the median line in the strait.[xii] ISW has reported that some of “gray zone” tactics increased during Taiwan’s 2023-2024 election season in tandem with influence operations over local Taiwanese officials and businesspeople, as well as the PRC’s ongoing push for economic “cross-strait integration.”
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) denied media reports that ROC-PRC negotiations on the “Kinmen incident” broke down and said they would resume after Kinmen prosecutors finish investigating the incident. The Kinmen incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, which is roughly 10 kilometers from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. PRC and ROC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations on Kinmen to resolve disputes around the incident, including PRC demands that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) apologize, reveal the truth of what happened, and return the capsized boat. Taiwanese media reported that the negotiations collapsed on March 6 because the two sides failed to reach a consensus and went home. The CGA claimed the negotiations broke down because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not recognize Taiwan’s maritime boundaries or law enforcement rights.[xiii] The MAC denied that negotiations had “broken down,” however, and merely said the first phase of negotiations had ended. MAC officials said negotiations would resume after Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.[xiv] [xv]
A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government. Quanzhou Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) deputy director Li Zhaohui was one of three leaders of a PRC delegation to negotiate with Taiwanese authorities about the February 14 capsizing incident.[xvi] The other two were Jinjiang Red Cross chairman Cao Rongshan and Director of the Coordination Department of the China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) Xu Weiwei.[xvii] Quanzhou and Jinjiang are PRC cities near the Kinmen islands. Although Li is a TAO official, PRC state media CGTN, Enlightenment Daily, and other PRC media described him as an associate or advisor to the Red Cross in articles about the negotiations.[xviii] The ROC side of the negotiations was led by CGA officials including Deputy Director-General Hsu Ching-chih and Fleet Branch Director Liao Te-cheng.[xix]
The presence of a PRC government official at the negotiations is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not directly interacting with the Taiwanese government. This has been the CCP’s policy since Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party became president of Taiwan in 2016. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be held on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Tsai and the DPP do not recognize. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.
Li’s involvement in the negotiations also undermines the CCP’s effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast with the DPP. KMT vice chairman Andrew Hsia traveled to the PRC and met with TAO director Song Tao on February 29 to discuss the Kinmen capsizing incident concurrently with the DPP government-led negotiations on Kinmen.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and DPP-led government raised concerns that a KMT push to legalize absentee voting for overseas Taiwanese could enable CCP interference in Taiwan’s elections. Taiwanese voters are required to return to the city or county of their household registration to vote in elections.[xx] Taiwan’s cabinet approved a bill in February 2024 that allows absentee voting for national referenda for Taiwanese nationals living in Taiwan. This means that voters can vote in person in the area where they live instead of having to return to their hometown. Premier Chen Chien-jen and Interior Minister Lin Yu-chang said the government has no plans to permit absentee voting for national elections, however.[xxi] The KMT has been pushing for legislation to legalize absentee voting in elections, including permitting mail-in ballots for Taiwanese people living overseas. DPP politicians including National Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen raised concerns that permitting overseas absentee voting, especially for Taiwanese people living in the PRC, could create a security risk of PRC interference in Taiwan’s elections.[xxii] KMT politicians, including party chairman Eric Chu, pointed out that many countries, including the United States, have implemented absentee voting and accused the DPP of disenfranchising Taiwanese citizens under the pretense of national security.[xxiii]
Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council estimates that around 2 million Taiwanese citizens live overseas, excluding the PRC.[xxiv] Estimates of Taiwanese who live or work in the PRC range from around 160,000 according to the PRC’s 2021 census to over 1 million by other estimates.[xxv] The CCP frequently conducts outreach to Taiwanese businesspeople and other ROC nationals living in the PRC to influence them to vote for more PRC-friendly candidates.
Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections. KMT Chairman Eric Chu announced on March 6 that the party would disband its historic Huang Fuxing branch and reorganize it into a “veterans service working committee.” Huang Fuxing is a powerful conservative branch of the party that older military veterans and their dependents dominate. It supports Taiwan’s eventual reunification with China. It is organized separately from local party branches and has around 80,000 members. Chu said the reform was part of an effort to improve the efficiency of party affairs, integrate with local governments to expand services to party members, and appeal to younger generations.[xxvi] KMT vice chairman Sean Lien said the reorganization aims to better allocate party resources. He said that Huang Fuxing’s NT$60 million of annual expenditures amounted to the KMT’s largest expense and dwarfed spending on other departments including publicity, youth, and women’s party organizations.[xxvii] Various Huang Fuxing members and other KMT politicians strongly objected to the reform, however, and said it could cost the KMT a crucial base of support in elections. Some hardliners called on Eric Chu to resign and threatened to leave the KMT or join third parties like the Taiwan People’s Party or the New Party to show their displeasure.[xxviii]
The KMT’s dissolution of the Huang Fuxing branch shows an effort by the party’s central leadership to constrain the influence of the older and more conservative deep-Blue faction in favor of appealing to younger voters. The reform was triggered by the KMT’s loss in the 2024 presidential election and the increasing unpopularity of PRC-friendly policies promoted by the deep-Blue wing of the party.
The reforms may lead the KMT to moderate its stance on cross-strait relations to be more in line with the Taiwanese public, which overwhelmingly embraces a Taiwanese (and not Chinese) identity and opposes unification with China. The reforms risk former members of Huang Fuxing leaving the KMT or defecting to other parties, however, which would split the pan-Blue vote in future elections and decrease the KMT’s chances of victory.
China
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.[xxix] Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress on March 5 omitted the word “peaceful” in the continuation of a trend of CCP officials using less restrained language about unification with Taiwan. Chen said the PRC is willing to “create a broad space for peaceful reunification” but will never renounce the right to use force or “all necessary measures” to achieve reunification. This language is consistent with the PRC’s standard messaging regarding Taiwan. The TAO is the primary agency responsible for cross-strait relations and conducting the PRC’s Taiwan policy.
The PRC’s recent measures to exert pressure on the ROC illustrate its adoption of a more aggressive approach to realizing unification, however. These measures include influence operations and the use of law enforcement to erode Taiwan’s territorial control. The PRC recently expanded its efforts to conceal its pressure campaigns. Deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs Wang Huning led an interagency meeting in December to coordinate and camouflage the CCP’s efforts to influence Taiwan’s elections, according to a Taiwanese intelligence leak of the top-secret meeting. Wang allegedly urged officials at the meeting to step up effectiveness to influence Taiwan’s public opinion and reduce the detectability of its tactics by “external parties.”[xxx] The PRC’s opportunistic exploitation of the Kinmen capsizing incident to increase pressure on Taiwan further illustrates its growing pressure on Taiwan. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) pledged in February to strengthen law enforcement and conduct regular inspections in the waters around Kinmen, resulting in an unprecedented boarding of a Taiwanese civilian vessel in Kinmen’s waters.[xxxi]
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s address during the Twentieth Party Congress in 2022 also signals the impetus for more intense efforts to pressure Taiwan. Xi called for cracking down on Taiwanese separatism and foreign interference in Taiwan and urged stronger efforts to realize unification.[xxxii] Xi’s call to action serves to galvanize a more aggressive attitude in CCP policymakers, indicating the trend of escalation against Taiwan will continue.
Russia and Iran
The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.[xxxiii] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment of ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[xxxiv] The annual exercise began in 2019.[xxxv] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[xxxvi] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.[xxxvii]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain. The PLA flew a Y-9 medium transport aircraft in the Miyako Strait on March 9 and 10.[xxxviii] It then flew a Y-9 and two H-6 bombers through the Miyako Strait on March 12.[xxxix] Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[xl] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait. [xli] The concentration of the PLA component of these intrusions in the southwest indicates the PLA’s intent to operate outside the first island chain.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The PRC sent 11 proposals for “managing the situation at sea and carrying our maritime cooperation” to the Philippines in April 2023.[xlii] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbing claimed on March 12, 2024, that “the Philippines has not yet responded to most of the proposals and made frequent infringements and provocations at sea.” [xliii] Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated on March 11, 2024 that “we have not rejected any proposals that China has made to us but the premise is something that we questioned…that premise that China has made is that their territory follows what is now described as a 10 dash line.”[xliv] The 10 dash line is the expansive PRC territorial claim over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The PRC’s nine-dash line precursor claimed the same territory but with one less dash around Taiwan.
Wang’s comments aim to deflect blame from the PRC to the Philippines for heightened tensions over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal. The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions near the shoal to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen in the area. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship. Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.
The CCG actions in the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found the nine dash line claims are unlawful. The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.
The PRC and Philippines’ bilateral diplomatic forums for managing tensions in the South China Sea are unlikely to change PRC behavior in the region. The CCP has a track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises to achieve its political objective. In 2012 the party engaged in negotiations with the Philippines to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[xlv] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[xlvi] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[xlvii] In 2016 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines by rejecting the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine dash line and land reclamation activities.[xlviii] The CCP has ignored the ruling by continuing land reclamation efforts and maritime coercion in the South China Sea over the last eight years.
These PRC efforts continue despite PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong and Philippine Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro co-chairing the eighth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea in January 2024.[xlix] The PRC has continued its coercive behavior over the past decade in the South China Sea while not honoring prior diplomatic or international legal agreements.
Vietnam
The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory. [l]A baseline is a conceptual line that a state uses to define its territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. The PRC last issued a baseline in 1996 with the announcement of 49 points that stretch eastward from the island of Hainan to the Shandong peninsula on its eastern seaboard.[li] The 1996 baseline excluded the Gulf of Tonkin. The PRC and Vietnam signed the landmark Maritime Boundary Delimitation Agreement in 2000 that defined each country’s territorial waters and EEZs in the Gulf of Tonkin.[lii] The new PRC baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin extends 24 nautical miles beyond where normal basepoints would be under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[liii]
Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Pham Thu Hang urged that the PRC adhere to the UNCLOS when determining the baseline to measure territorial waters and “respect and comply with” the 2000 delimitation agreement. [liv] The PRC claimed that the baseline is in accordance with its domestic laws, however.[lv] The PRC’s Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs posted on WeChat that the new baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin “fills the gap of the westernmost part of the Chinese mainland’s territorial sea.”[lvi] The WeChat announcement framed the baseline necessary to exercise national sovereignty and jurisdiction in the territorial sea.
The PRC’s rationale for the new baseline is unclear. The baseline is consistent with PRC efforts to solidify its legal claims over maritime areas and features, however. The PRC has taken incremental steps over decades to consolidate control over its ambitious maritime territorial claims, which encompass the entirety of the South China Sea. This is evident in the PRC’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, its excessive baseline assertions around them in 1996, and subsequent militarization across the Paracels. The PRC’s gradual assertion of sovereignty over the Paracel Islands highlights a gradational strategy to increase control and legitimacy in the disputed territory over long periods. The PRC’s gradual delimitation of regional bodies of water serves to establish a basis for its territorial claims and ultimately advance its control over sensitive maritime areas.
Maritime territorial conflicts between the PRC and Vietnam stretch back decades, with each country claiming to have held sovereignty over contested areas for centuries. Past disputes include the Gulf of Tonkin, while unresolved claims over the resource-rich and strategically important areas encompassing the Paracel and Spratly Islands make for ongoing conflict.
The PRC conducts regular maritime patrols around Vietnam’s oil and gas fields, which receive less public attention than PRC engagements with other rival claimants such as the Philippines.[lvii]
The PRC and Vietnam have a long-standing record of maritime disputes in the South China Sea and engage in occasional high-profile confrontations over South China Sea territorial claims. The PRC instigated a tense standoff in 2014 by deploying an oil rig in disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam saw as a direct territorial provocation. The PRC sent approximately 40 Coast Guard vessels, 6 warships, a military aircraft, and dozens of logistical and fishing vessels to support the rig, prompting reciprocal military deployment from Vietnam.[lviii] The standoff ended when the PRC withdrew the oil rig after two months, claiming early completion of its work and denying any relevance to “external factors.”[lix]
Oceania
The United States approved $7.1 billion in funding for the Compacts of Free Association, which are the financial assistance commitments that govern the US relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands and grant US military access throughout their territories. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a 20-year period in 2003.[lx] The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May and the Marshall Islands in October and the US Congress approved them in March 2024.[lxi] [lxii] The $7.1 billion will cover the new 20-year COFAs that cover the period 2024 to 2043.[lxiii]
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https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202403080055.aspx
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[iii] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202403130127.aspx
[iv] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20240308004706-260407?chdtv
[v] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/12/29/2003811325
[vi] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202403120215.aspx
[vii] https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Line-in-the-sand-Chinese-dredgers-are-stealing-Taiwan-bit-by-bit
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[ix] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/4084205
[x] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3245500/taiwan-seize-intruding-sand-dredgers-mainland-china-fight-illegal-mining-and-grey-zone-warfare
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[xi] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-11/taiwan-warns-china-likely-to-increase-pressure-on-new-government
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[xii] https://reuters.com/world/china/china-steps-up-grey-zone-warfare-exhaust-taiwan-defence-report-says-2024-03-07/
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[xv] http://www.gwytb dot gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202403/t20240313_12605907.htm
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[xix] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/5104572
[xx] https://web.cec dot gov.tw/english/cms/ctw
[xxi] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202403120013
[xxii] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202403110036.aspx
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[xxiv] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3247458/my-responsibility-why-overseas-taiwanese-are-returning-cast-their-votes
[xxv] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20210511002936-260409?chdtv
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[xxvi] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202403070010
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[xxvii] https://www.rti dot org.tw/news/view/id/2198534
[xxviii] https://www.worldjournal dot com/wj/story/121218/7814333
[xxix] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202403/t20240313_12605907.htm
[xxx] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/08/asia/taiwan-intelligence-china-leaders-meeting-election-interference-intl-hnk/index.html
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[xxxii] https://www.gov dot cn/xinwen/2022-10/16/content_5718884.htm
[xxxiii] https://iz dot ru/1663152/2024-03-11/otriad-korablei-vmf-rf-pribyl-na-ucheniia-v-iran
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[xxxiv] https://iz dot ru/1663152/2024-03-11/otriad-korablei-vmf-rf-pribyl-na-ucheniia-v-iran
[xxxv] https://apnews.com/article/d4837be91b07721428230a5addc00a9d
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https://iz dot ru/1663152/2024-03-11/otriad-korablei-vmf-rf-pribyl-na-ucheniia-v-iran
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[xxxvii] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-iran-china-hold-warship-drills-gulf-oman-2024-03-11/
[xxxviii] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2024/p20240309_01.pdf
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[xxxix] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2024/p20240312_01.pdf
[xl] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2024/p20240123_02.pdf
[xli] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2024/p20240123_02.pdf
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[xliii] http://us.china-embassy dot gov.cn/eng/lcbt/wjbfyrbt/202403/t20240312_11259713.htm
[xliv] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhiOT41HJrs
[xlv] https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/
[xlvi] https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/
[xlvii] https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/
[xlviii] https://news.usni.org/2016/07/12/document-overview-south-china-sea-tribunal-decision
[xlix] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202401/t20240117_11228188.shtml
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[li] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/tyfg_674913/200904/t20090409_9866755.shtml
[lii] https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202336/v2336.pdf
[liii] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3255245/are-china-and-vietnam-collision-course-over-beijings-creeping-demarcation-gulf-tonkin
[liv] https://www.vietnam dot vn/en/de-nghi-trung-quoc-ton-trong-hiep-dinh-phan-dinh-vinh-bac-bo/
[lv] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/tonkin-baseline-03152024042026.html#:~:text=After%20nine%20years%20of%20negotiation,in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Tonkin.
[lvi] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/7BcjFTvIqjA9VjdrwbsAeg
[lvii] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3250699/vietnams-restrained-approach-maritime-issues-key-fewer-muted-confrontations-china
[lviii] https://tuoitrenews dot vn/news/society/20140609/chinese-vessels-try-to-scare-vietnam%E2%80%99s-ships-further-away-from-illegal-rig/3694.html
[lix] http://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1175131.shtml
[lx] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).
[lxi] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-witnesses-the-signing-of-the-u-s-palau-2023-agreement-following-the-compact-of-free-association-section-432-review/
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-signs-agreement-continue-micronesia-assistance-under-strategic-pact-2023-05-23/
[lxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-negotiator-expects-sign-new-deal-with-strategic-marshall-islands-monday-2023-10-16/
[lxiii] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).
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