Contemporary China-Taiwan cross-Straits relations have become a significant defining feature of regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, and are an equally important bone of contention in the US-China relationship. However, trends from this past decade indicate that cross-Straits dynamics are being shaped not just by unpredictable trigger events, but by four persistent and fundamental factors – political changes brought about by the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) since 2016, a strengthening sense of social identity in the Taiwanese population, increasing proximity between Taiwan and the US, and increasing Chinese power and assertiveness under Xi Jinping.
DPP’s China Policy – a Fundamental Departure from the Past
Since 2016, Tsai Ing-Wen has assumed the post of President and led her party, the DPP, to a majority victory in the Taiwanese legislative yuan, twice. In these eight years, the island’s China policy has become sterner, marking a stark shift away from the Kuomintang party (KMT)’s own eight-year-long policy of engaging in continued dialogue and maintaining open lines of communication and negotiation with China. Under Tsai, the Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has conceptualised DPP’s China policy as one that is centered around “peaceful development, equality, mutual benefits, and mutual trust.”
Flowing from the demand for mutual trust and peer equality with China, the DPP under Tsai has repudiated the ‘1992 Consensus’ (九二共識).[i] The 1992 Consensus, unwritten in a single document but a key agreement between the two sides on the existence of ‘One China’, has proved controversial throughout the history of cross-straits relations because of differing interpretations of the phrase between the two sides (popularly known as ‘One China, different expressions’, 中各表; or ‘One China, respective interpretations’, 個中國各自表述).[ii] However, in China’s interpretation, Taiwan is a breakaway province and a subservient party in the greater Chinese nation, with the Communist Party (CPC) being the legitimate leader of the ‘One China’. This interpretation has been unacceptable for the DPP, even though their predecessor, the KMT, was willing to look past it to maintain a functional relationship with China. Now, the DPP is enhancing Taiwan’s sovereign identity, and rejecting the idea that the government of the island, in any way, is subservient to the CPC.
With a renewed sense of sovereign identity, the DPP’s policy has shifted away from dialogue and negotiation with China to investing in three ‘Ds’ – defence capabilities, diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, and strengthening of democratic institutions on the island. This policy approach has led Beijing to suspend any meaningful talks with Tsai since 2016, and to adopt a host of coercive measures discussed ahead.
Domestically, however, some politicians on the deep-green end of the pan-Green spectrum (the more progressive and independence-minded coalition of policymakers) believe that Tsai is a “closet KMT Politician” who has not coped well with China’s military posturing or ally-poaching. In fact, Tsai’s mishandling of cross-Straits ties was one of the reasons why a Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll found her approval ratings sinking to 41.4 per cent in the first six months of her assuming office in 2016.[iii] She has nonetheless managed to keep the conflict of interests between the two sides of the pan-green spectrum in check.
However, her presidential predecessor, Lai Ching-te, who will assume office in May 2024, has labelled himself a “pragmatic Taiwan independence worker,” and not just during the presidential debate in the run-up to the elections, but also during his campaign opposing Tsai in the November 2018 ‘nine-in-one’ local elections. Subsequently, he has earned the badges of being “secessionist” and “confrontation-minded” from Beijing, and of being the “poster boy”[iv] of the deep-greens. His upcoming tenure is faced with a two-fold challenge – managing the differences within the pan-Green coalition on how independence-minded the DPP should be, and navigating the policymaking deadlocks vis-a-vis defence budgeting and foreign policy, now that the DPP no longer retains majority in the legislative yuan.
Strengthening Sense of Social Identity in the Taiwanese Population
Within the Taiwanese population, a strengthened sense of sovereign identity is taking shape, which has led to a majority to reject the idea of any changes to the status quo in cross-Straits relations, or the Chinese proposition that the “one country, two systems model” will be beneficial to “compatriots” on both sides.
In this regard, key findings from surveys such as the ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)’s March 2023 opinion poll on ‘Public’s View on Current Cross-Strait Relations’,[v] and the National Chengchi University Election Center’s Survey[vi] from June 2023, present important insights. The MAC survey, for example, tells us that an overwhelming majority of the surveyed population (about 80 per cent) disagree with the “one country, two systems” model, and 89 per cent of them support the maintenance of the status quo. Similarly, the Election Center Survey indicates that 62.8 per cent of the surveyed population believes that their identity is ‘Taiwanese’, and not ‘Chinese’, or even ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’. In this light, a majority of the Taiwanese population seems to be moving significantly away from the CPC’s expectations in how it identifies itself and what future it envisions for cross-straits relations (i.e. one where there is no room for reunification).
These attitudes are also reflected in the population’s political preferences. Despite ups and downs in Tsai’s approval ratings during her tenure and dissatisfaction of the population with other domestic issues such as corruption, lack of employment opportunities, and the mis-handling of COVID-19, a majority of the population with defined political preferences, prefers the DPP to the KMT. This is reflected in another one of the Election Center’s surveys from June 2023,[vii] wherein a majority of the respondents with defined political preferences show more support to the DPP (27.3 per cent) than to the KMT (18.1 per cent). One of the big reasons behind this is the concern that a KMT-led government may open doors for increased proximity between Taipei and Beijing, and hurt the former’s sovereign interests. Taking these socio-political preferences into account, the DPP under Tsai has stood strong on at least its rhetoric to deter China, and the same is expected from Lai.
Increasing Proximity between the US and Taiwan
In the past few years, the US and Taiwan have developed closer relations as part of their bilateral efforts to counter Chinese aggression, and to also promote shared democratic values. This proximity has manifested itself in enhanced efforts to deepen political, trade, defence, and people-to-people ties. In some instances, it has also invited a starkly aggressive response from China.
A key feature of the deepening defence ties, is that American arms sales to Taiwan have become more frequent and greater in volume. And this phenomenon precedes Joe Biden’s presidency in the US – under Donald Trump’s presidency, for example, eight sets of arms and defence-related transactions with Taiwan took place in 2020 alone, amounting to approximately $5.9 billion worth of transactions. Under Biden, there have been 15 such transactions since 2022, worth approximately $4 billion. These transactions are diverse, too, ranging from sales of hard equipment such as main battle tanks and multi-role fighters and spare parts for wheeled vehicles, to transactions involving training of Taiwanese armed forces personnel.
The steady arms sales and training support provided to Taiwan is supported by the US’s commitments to the island’s defence under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, as well as the understanding within some sections of the government that US’s interventions during a cross-Straits conflict scenario may not be enough. This is evident from the results of a tabletop wargame exercise conducted by the US House Select Committee on China in April 2023,[viii] where it was concluded through a bipartisan brainstorming process that any conflict in the Taiwan Straits will cost the US, Chinese and global economies real pain due to losses worth trillions of dollars. Furthermore, results from tabletop wargame exercises conducted by American think tanks such as the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)[ix] and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)[x] respectively also show how even with the eventual victory of a US-led coalition in a conflict scenario, the conflict itself will be quite protracted, and “dozens of [American] ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers” will be lost. In this regard, the House Select Committee came to the conclusion that there is an urgent need to “arm Taiwan to the teeth,” and clear the $19 billion worth of arms sales promised to the island.
On the trade front, the US and Taiwan are in the process of negotiating a ‘U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade’, and the Phase-I agreement[xi] for this Initiative has already been signed in June 2023. Through this agreement, the goal is to reduce tariff barriers between the two sides and coordinate labour and environment-related regulatory policies, so that there is increased business interoperability. Moreover, to ensure smooth flow of talent and industry personnel between the two sides, US Congressional delegations have been making frequent visits to Taiwan, while key Taiwanese politicians, too, have been making pit-stops in the US to engage with government, think tanks, and business. Two such visits – that of the then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei in August 2022, and that of Tsai to California in April 2023, where she met with the then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy – caused great concern in China, and even led it to conduct missile-firing exercises around Taiwan.
Increasing Chinese Power and Assertiveness under Xi Jinping
Despite domestic economic headwinds and the existence of a hostile external environment where China has lost mutual trust with many of its neighbours, under Xi Jinping, the country remains committed to curbing any possibility of Taiwan’s independence or of enhanced international legitimacy for the island’s cause. However, the values and propositions underpinning Chinese vehemence on Taiwan are, of course, historical, and range from the CPC’s mission to achieve the “Chinese dream” of “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (中華民族偉大復興),[xii] of which reunification with Taiwan is a fundamental pillar. In the CPC’s conception, there is only ‘One China’, and Taiwan is a specially administered province of the mainland with no sovereign identity of its own. In this backdrop, the DPP’s policy approach to cross-Straits relations is viewed by Beijing as “secessionist” and even illegitimate, while any proximity between US and Taiwan is viewed as the violation of commitments made by the US to China under the ‘Three Joint Communiqués’ of 1972, 1979 and 1982.[xiii]
Subsequently, China has adopted an arsenal of coercive measures to turn cross-Straits dynamics in its favour. Such measures can be divided into military, economic, and political.
On the military front, extensive combat preparedness work is underway in the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC), which also led the two above-mentioned live-fire exercises in six zones around Taiwan in August 2022 and April 2023. Apart from these drastic measures, China also uses continued military interventions such as regular flybys and sorties of its fighter jets, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and naval vessels beyond the median line of the Taiwan Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Seeing as the median line acts as a de-facto maritime border between the two sides, any PLA activity beyond it coaxes Taiwanese defence forces to keep their guard up and experience an exhaustion of resources. In fact, this has also been China’s goal while making unilateral changes[xiv] to the routes of commercial flights along the M503 route which runs parallel to the median line on the Chinese side. Given that the area close to the M503 is also a training ground[xv] for the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), undiscussed changes in flight routes can risk collision, and lead the ROCAF to maintain a robust communications and clearance system, which has become nearly impossible with a Beijing that is unwilling to communicate.
On the economic front, China has weaponised the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) by suspending preferential tax rates for Taiwanese firms. For example, just recently, in January 2024, the Chinese State Council Customs Tariff Commission decided to suspend preferential tax rates for Taiwanese chemical imports into the country as granted under the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, has referred to this measure[xvi] as being “reasonable, legal, and evidence-based, constituting normal economic conduct.” He contends that it is so because since the DPP came to power in 2016, it has refused to acknowledge the ‘1992 consensus’ and has continued to emphasise ‘Taiwan’s independence’, both of which are in violation of the fundamental principles underpinning the ECFA. China has also sanctioned multiple US defence firms such as BAE Systems Land and Armament and Raytheon Technologies for their arms and equipment sales to Taiwan.
On the political (and geopolitical front), China has engaged with an interplay of measures to keep the Taiwanese spirit in check. It has regularly engaged in election interference and ally-poaching. Most recently, in the run up to the January 2024 elections in Taiwan, Beijing invited numerous local KMT politicians and their family members, as well as high-ranking KMT officials such as Vice-Chairman Andrew Hsia, for visits to various cities of China. When they were placed under investigation by the DPP under the ROC ‘Anti-Infiltration Law’, Chen Binhua referred to it as the DPP’s ‘Green Terror’.[xvii] On the international stage, during Tsai’s tenure, China has successfully poached ten of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, leaving the island with just 12 of them. In the process, ‘dollar-diplomacy’ has been of great help to the Chinese, as most of Taiwan’s allies have been small nations with meagre GDPs and expansive developmental requirements. And when China-allies have attempted to show diplomatic support to Taiwan, it has resorted to high-level sanctions and import restrictions against them. A case in point is Lithuania, which faced the brunt of Chinese trade sanctions in December 2021, in response to Vilnius’s decision to open a “Taiwan Representative Office” (駐立陶宛台灣代表處).[xviii]
China’s is an ever-expanding base of traditional and grey-zone tactics, which has broadened the scope of deterrence measures required and has significantly impacted the stability of the cross-Straits relationship.
Conclusion
As the world looks to the Taiwan Straits and the continually evolving policies and tactics of the stakeholders involved, there is a consensus emerging that any conflict in the region will have drastic global economic and humanitarian implications. Moreover, the four above-mentioned factors remain fundamental in the making or breaking of the situation in the Straits, and have created fault-lines that are not easily resolvable. In this regard, the hope for peace and stability lies in a few but major bets – that China fundamentally alter its position on use of force with Taiwan, taking into accounts the risks and costs of conflict, that the US’s deterrence tactics prove to be optimal, and that the Taiwanese population and political dispensation continue to support the status quo while investing in the island’s defence capabilities and diplomatic standing.
[i] “九二共識Q&A,” National Policy Foundation, Taiwan, https://www.npf.org.tw/13/8642.
[ii] Tung Chen-Yuan and Chen Shuo-Ting, “The Formation, Implementation and Dissolution of the 1992 Consensus,” Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan), https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/5733c319e040424991256066e8ec4752/Section_file/af23c111cae94cf2809f9ad4292cd8ac.pdf.
[iii] “Pro-Green Poll: Tsai’s Approval Rating Drops to 41.4%,” Kuomintang Official Website, 29 November 2016, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=18495.
[iv] Charlie Lyons Jones, “Taiwan: Tsai Ing-wen’s battle to discipline the DPP,” The Interpreter, The Lowy Institute, 8 January 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-s-battle-discipline-dpp.
[v] “Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey on the ‘Public’s View on Current Cross-Strait Relations’,” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), March 2023, https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/297/relfile/8010/6247/76c07916-2840-45ce-898e-fd0f8fb221c3.pdf
[vi] “Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992~2023.06),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, June 2023, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6961/People202306.jpg.
[vii] “Changes in the Party Identification of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992~2023.06),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, June 2023, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6964/Party202306.jpg.
[viii] “Gallagher, Krishnamoorthi Lead Committee Members in Wargame on CCP Invasion of Taiwan,” The Select Committee on the CCP, United States House of Representatives, 24 April 2023, https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/internal-events/gallagher-krishnamoorthi-lead-committee-members-wargame-ccp-invasion-taiwan.
[ix] Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser and Chris Dougherty, “Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan,” Center for a New American Security, 15 June 2022, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans.
[x] Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo, “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force would be a Pyrrhic Victory for China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 November 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/reunification-taiwan-through-force-would-be-pyrrhic-victory-china.
[xi] “AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN AND THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES REGARDING TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TAIWAN,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, June 2023, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/US-Taiwan%20Initiative%20on%2021st%20Century%20Trade%20First%20Agreement%20-%20June%202023.pdf.
[xii] “習近平關於實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢論述摘編 (Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Discourse on the Realization of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and the Chinese Dream),” Theory Library, People.com.cn, December 2023, http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/68294/388648/index.html.
[xiii] “Three Communiqués,” American Institute in Taiwan, https://www.ait.org.tw/tag/three-communiques/.
[xiv] “民航局优化M503航线运行 (Civil Aviation Administration optimizes the operation of the M503 route),” Civil Aviation Administration of China, 30 January 2024, https://www.caac.gov.cn/XWZX/MHYW/202401/t20240130_222832.html.
[xv] “M503 Might Just Be the Beginning,” Thinking Taiwan, https://thinking-taiwan.com/m503-might-just-be-the-beginning/.
[xvi] Shi Longhong and Liu Huan, “国台办：有关部门决定中止ECFA部分产品关税减让合理合法、有据有节 (Taiwan Affairs Office: Relevant departments decide to suspend tariff reductions for certain products under ECFA, which is reasonable, legal, and well-founded),” Xinhuanet, 27 December 2023, http://www.xinhuanet.com/20231227/bca7c5f036fa40139d414bf62ddb3209/c.html.
[xvii] Matthew Strong, “41 Taipei neighborhood chiefs questioned about China trips ahead of election,” Taiwan News, 15 December 2023, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5060604.
[xviii] “駐立陶宛台灣代表處 (The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), https://www.mofa.gov.tw/OverseasOffice_Content.aspx?n=168&sms=87&s=27&os=131.
