Deterrability: diverging US views – ???? Feedzy

By Yang Kuang-shun ???

Today, politics no longer stop at the water’s edge when it concerns the foreign policy of the US, particularly regarding the question of whether it should sustain its support for war-torn Ukraine. The issue is divisive not only between Republicans and Democrats, but also among conservative camp internationalists and isolationists. However, support for Taiwan against Chinese aggression stands as one of the few topics that unite US politicians across the aisle.

The Biden administration has amplified the momentum of support for Taiwan, a stance that began with its immediate predecessor, evident in US President Joe Biden’s unequivocal commitment to defending Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Republican leaders, including unapologetic “China hawks,” remain hesitant to follow Biden’s suit. The disparity in the proposed deterrence strategies between the two major US political parties might not necessarily reflect differing perceptions of China as a threat or varying assessment of the need to stand by Taiwan. Rather, it underscores their diverging views on the deterrability of China.

REPUBLICANS’ DETERRENCE STRATEGIES AGAINST CHINA: STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY AND PROMOTING TAIWAN’S SELF-DEFENSE

The growing inclination toward isolationism within the Republican Party could be attributed to certain conservative opinion leaders who advocate for disengagement from foreign conflicts, such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. Yet, even prominent GOP isolationists who oppose containment strategies for China and Russia express strong support for Taiwan. Congressman Thomas Massie, who voted against human rights bills for Hong Kong and Uighurs, affirmed that the US is an “ally” to Taiwan and that Taiwan needs to “maintain their independence and we should support that” before then-US house speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. Senator Josh Hawley penned a letter to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, emphasizing that “Taiwan is more important for US national interests than Ukraine.” He advocated prioritizing the provision of arms to Taiwan over supplying weapons to Ukraine.

Many Republican politicians often pride themselves on being “China hawks,” and frequently label their Democratic colleagues as being “soft on China.” However, none of these mainstream GOP leaders endorse US military intervention in response to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, as Biden did. Instead, their stance centers on bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities as a means to deter China. Former US vice president Mike Pence firmly stated that China would not consider seizing Taiwan because the US would “achieve peace through strength.” Florida Governor Ron DeSantis noted that the goals should be “to deter a military situation from happening” and “maintaining the status quo that we have now.” Former US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley stressed that “it’s not US military intervention; it’s what we are doing to prevent war.” Senator Tim Scott advocated for the provision of the necessary resources, equipment and military weapons to Taiwan and exercises with Taiwanese people before “mak[ing] that decision at the time” if necessary. North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum underscored the significance of placing anti-ship missiles on Taiwan to enhance deterrence against China, thereby pursuing “peace through strength.” Even Republican US presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy’s proposal of “exporting our Second Amendment” to Taiwan by putting a gun “in every Taiwanese household” aligns with the concept of rendering Taiwan a “porcupine” which would not be easy for China to swallow.

In addition to promoting the reinforcement of Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, certain GOP leaders turn to the long-standing approach of “strategic ambiguity” as a potent deterrent against China. Former US president Donald Trump exhibited caution when asked whether the US would intervene militarily to safeguard Taiwan because “it will put me in a very bad negotiating position.” Ramaswamy, despite his commitment to Taiwan’s defense, also supports the resumption of the strategic ambiguity policy after the US achieves “semiconductor independence” in 2028. Senator Rand Paul posits that the strategic ambiguity policy, which does not obligate the US to defend Taiwan, serves to prevent unnecessary US provocation of China and keep the world guessing about how the US intends to use its military might. Through this policy, the US could deter China from initiating actions to conquer Taiwan.

END OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

Before taking office, Biden and key members of his team, including National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and Kurt Campbell, Biden’s Asia policy czar in the National Security Council, adhered to the doctrine of US “strategic ambiguity.” Shortly after taking up his role as the NSC Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Campbell still denounced the concept of US strategic clarity, highlighting its “significant downsides.”

Nevertheless, Biden has made statements on four separate occasions asserting his commitment to Taiwan’s defense via military means. These pronouncements might serve as a means to reassure Taiwan in the context of, for instance, the US exit from Afghanistan, the absence of US military intervention in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the Chinese military exercises surrounding Taiwan following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

Biden’s declaration of a willingness to defend Taiwan militarily is widely interpreted as a departure from the longstanding US policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan. However, this assertion has not been formalized into a treaty alliance, mainly due to the unofficial nature of the US-Taiwan relations conditioned by the US’ “one China” policy. The sustainability of Biden’s commitment to Taiwan often raises questions, particularly in light of statements from administration officials reaffirming the unchanged stance toward Taiwan, a gesture often perceived as a “walking back” of Biden’s promise.

However, Campbell contended that “the President’s remarks speak for themselves” after Biden’s fourth affirmation to defend Taiwan militarily, adding that it was inappropriate to call the White House remarks a walking back of Biden’s remarks. Admiral Harry Harris, former Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command and ambassador to South Korea, posited that Biden has set a standard regarding the US’ stance on defending Taiwan, given his repeated commitments. Harris suggested that “we take him at his word and plan accordingly,” and unelected officials, or even future presidents, cannot “walk that back to zero.”

DIVERGING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF CHINA’S DETERRABILITY ACROSS THE AISLE

A more effective differentiator of the two parties’ position on Taiwan does not appear to be their levels of resolve in defending the island, but rather their strategies for providing that defense. These strategies reflect distinct levels of situational awareness among party lines. This awareness extends beyond merely gauging the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan; it also encompasses assessments of whether a war is avoidable, China is deterrable, or Chinese President Xi Jinping (???) could be negotiated with.

The notion of a country’s deterrability revolves around assessing how likely a regime would choose to launch a conflict, rather than being deterred, against all odds. This issue gains special prominence during periods of a regime’s legitimacy crisis, where rationality might drive actions for domestic political survival, even if such actions appear irrational from an external standpoint.

David Shlapak, a senior international research analyst at the RAND Corporation, discussed the issue of deterrability within Maoist China, a regime characterized by behaviors of an “unstable, irrational — even crazy — state.” The massive casualties caused by the Cultural Revolution only served Mao Zedong’s (???) restoration of leadership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Shlapak underscored that China emerged as a “responsible” nuclear power on the international stage, even amid the backdrop of a harsh and tumultuous domestic political struggle. However, it was also Mao, a precursor to nuclear blackmail, who did not hesitate to brandish the threat of nuclear war, despite the potential collateral damage to half of the Chinese population — approximately 300 million people at the time.

Hence, the examination of deterrability demands a comprehensive political assessment that takes into account personal and regime-level factors, rather than solely calculating a country’s military readiness. This complexity is precisely why figures like Biden and Trump frequently alluded to their understanding of Xi’s personality when contemplating the probability of Chinese invasion in Taiwan.

Despite both Republican Party and Democratic Party leaders claiming an in-depth comprehension of Xi’s personality, their assessments of the Chinese leader’s deterrability diverge widely. Republican politicians, as previously mentioned, exhibit confidence in the likelihood of averting a war across the Taiwan Strait through deterring a Chinese invasion. Trump asserted that he could avoid wars with his “personality,” and that Xi would not invade Taiwan under his presidency. On the other hand, Biden’s perspective on the prospect of avoiding a conflict with China might be more cautious. He views Xi as a “dictator” who might not have a full grasp of military situations, as was revealed during the Chinese spy balloon incident. Biden also perceives Xi as not looking for conflict or expansion of territory, despite his Chinese counterpart’s ambition to elevate China to the world’s foremost economic and military power. However, Biden also stated that “when bad folks have problems, they do bad things” when talking about China’s economic downturn.

DETER AN UNDETERRABLE CHINA?

Biden’s comment suggests that in times when Chinese leaders face domestic unpopularity, they might be incentivized to initiate a “diversionary war” to create a “gambling for resurrection” effect, as Kyle Haynes, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University, found it, to showcase their competence domestically. US professor of political science Jaroslav Tir highlighted the strong relationship between government unpopularity, particularly arising from economic underperformance, and the initiation of territorial conflicts. Scholars like RAND Corporation senior international defense researcher Timothy Heath, Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center research fellow Michael Cunningham and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) research fellow Sidharth Kaushal argued that the likelihood of China launching a diversionary conflict is very low due to several reasons. These include China’s limited capabilities, Chinese leaders’ preoccupation with domestic issues and their apprehension about an unfavorable outcome in the broader US-China superpower conflict following a diversionary aggression. University of Southern California assistant professor Erin Baggott Carter contended that China’s inclination toward diversionary aggression might cease once Xi’s domestic crisis passes. Jeffrey Ding, an assistant professor of political science at George Washington University, however, noted that a diversionary war on the part of China might occur when China’s economy is pushed too far down.

With the contingency of a Chinese invasion in mind, both Taiwan and the US align in implementing deterrence strategies like “deterrence by denial” and “extended deterrence.” Deterrence by denial seeks to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, rendering a Chinese invasion infeasible or unlikely to succeed. Taiwan has invested significantly in its military buildup, either through acquisition of conventional weapons systems or through development of asymmetric warfare capabilities, often with US assistance. Extended deterrence involves the US commitment to its allies and partners, serving as a deterrent against their potential aggressors. This commitment could be openly declared, as Biden did, thereby fostering “strategic clarity” to Taiwan. Alternatively, the US could opt to keep both Taiwan and the world in suspense about its potential intervention as part of the US’ “strategic ambiguity” policy.

Biden’s departure from this long-held strategic ambiguity policy, however, could stem from his assessment that Beijing’s deterrability has become so low that there is no point in the US keeping its allies and China guessing. Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies center fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro added that Chinese leaders already assume US intervention in a cross-Strait conflict without guessing Washington’s real intention. In this context, a successful deterrence scenario would emerge when China is convinced that the US could prevent an invasion from achieving its military objectives in Taiwan.

Biden’s message also carries a pessimistic implication: that there could be scenarios in which China is essentially undeterrable. Aaron Friedberg, professor of Politics and International Affairs in Princeton University; Project 2049 Institute Executive Director Mark Stokes and former White House adviser Peter Navarro have argued that CCP elites tend to prioritize the party’s continued rule over the welfare of the Chinese people or the state’s survival. They are more likely to concentrate their efforts on resolving a legitimacy crisis or a “survival issue” like Taiwan. As suggested by Johns Hopkins University professor Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, China might be a “peaking power” which “gambles big to reshape the balance of power before its window closes.” From this viewpoint, Taiwan is the most likely target of China’s “anxious expansion.” Beckley delves further into this rationale at the personal level, contending that dictators are more inclined to pursue legacy-building through adventurist actions when they age and have less time to reshape the world.

Much like the Biden administration’s “walk-and-chew-gum” strategy for simultaneous competition and cooperation with China, the efforts to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities and the commitment to intervene in a cross-Strait war are not necessarily mutually exclusive policy options. The US employs a dual strategy, aiding Taiwan in accelerating its military buildup via arms sales and military aid to reinforce deterrence against China. Meanwhile, Biden’s commitment to defending Taiwan could serve as a last resort of deterrence against China, leaving minimal room for the prospect of a Chinese victory. Given the potential inevitability of a Chinese invasion as discussed above, Biden’s message might be more about preparation for war rather than deterring one. As Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, has underlined, his first mission is to “prevent a conflict.” Yet “if deterrence fails, you must be prepared to fight and win.”

CONCLUSION

As the rivalry between the US and China intensifies, both Republicans and Democrats might showcase assertive postures toward China, frequently pointing fingers at each other for appearing “soft on China.” Nevertheless, their respective approaches to backing Taiwan against the Chinese threat might primarily result from differing levels of situational awareness regarding the nature of the Chinese threat, rather than indicating the extent of their support for Taiwan.

The situational awareness within the two parties might both hold validity, as the degree of China’s deterrability could be subject to dynamic fluctuations rather than a static state. The actual extent of China’s deterrability, the methods through which Chinese ruling elites showcase their deterrability, and how US politicians and experts perceive this deterrability all influence the situational awareness of US leadership. At times, countries are inclined to project a low level of deterrability, potentially as part of their blackmail or brinkmanship strategies. Rather than relying solely on anecdotal sources or political leaders’ personal observations or instincts, it requires interdisciplinary expertise, spanning fields like political science and psychology and reliable intelligence sources to accurately determine the true levels of China’s deterrability to avoid misperception.

The assessment of China’s deterrability does not necessarily translate into a binary policy choice of deterrence and non-deterrence for Taiwan and the US, such as Taiwan’s capitulation in response to China’s reduced deterrability. Instead, it advocates for an approach akin to the rationale behind “preventive driving,” which involves preparing for worst-case scenarios while maintaining the overarching goal of deterrence. Such an approach recognizes the complexity of the situation and the multifaceted factors that contribute to China’s deterrability. These factors might encompass Chinese leaders’ misperception of their relative advantage vis-a-vis Taiwan and the US. They could also pertain to Chinese leaders’ personal issues, such as declining health or legacy-building aspirations. All these factors have the potential to catalyze the revisionist inclination of Chinese leadership.

The discussion of China’s deterrability equips us with a framework to comprehend seemingly perplexing or irrational actions within a deterrence context. In practice, US politicians, Republican or Democratic, might simultaneously evaluate the two questions of how capable the US is of detering China and China’s deterrability. This comprehensive evaluation enables them to prepare for situations outside conventional wisdom and to formulate contingency plans to address potential worst-case scenarios.

Yang Kuang-shun is a cofounder of US-Taiwan Watch.