Written by Sanho Chung.
Image credit: 20190929 Taiwan Demonstration in Support of Hong Kong Protests 004 (cropped) by KOKUYO/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED.
It has been widely recognised that Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Movement in 2019 was the turning point of the 2020 General Election in Taiwan. In the last general election, Beijing’s hardline crackdown on the protests in Hong Kong gave rise to the Taiwanese’s mistrust of China and finally brought a big win to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was expected to lose both their majority over the Legislative Yuan and their presidency. But after three years of National Security Law (NSL) enactment in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong issue in this general election seems no longer as focal as it was. How should we make sense of this huge contrast in attention? Has “Hong Kong Influence” faded out totally?
How has Hong Kong been politically relevant in Taiwan historically?
Historically, despite their proximity to one another in terms of geopolitics and popular culture, the Hong Kong issue has rarely been a talking point for candidates since Taiwan’s democratic open-up in the 1990s. However, it does not mean that Hong Kong is politically irrelevant in Taiwan.
First, sympathy towards the democratic movement in Hong Kong is bipartisan among most Taiwanese politicians. Despite their varying attitudes towards China, when responding to inquiries concerning Hong Kong’s political future, almost all politicians in Taiwan would take a stand that favours democracy and civil liberty.
Second, there used to be vibrant interactions between leaders in both places. For example, back in the 2010s, especially after 2014, there were even some civic exchanges between politicians who emerged in the social movements, in particular the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. In 2017, a seminar with figures from the New Power Party of Taiwan and newly-elected pro-democracy legislators in Hong Kong was hosted to discuss the new generation’s political engagements in both places.
Third, Taiwan always sees Hong Kong as a “counter-factual” of unification with China. Since its handover in 1997, Hong Kong has been the PRC’s showroom of the “one country, two systems (1C2S)” model as a possible Cross-Strait unification arrangement for Taiwan. A democratic and autonomous Hong Kong under 1C2S would give Taiwan a prospect that Taiwan can also remain democratic and autonomous under the PRC’s unification arrangement. Consequently, the perceived legitimacy of this possibility will indicate to voters the acceptability of strengthening ties with China. This will significantly influence the campaign strategies of both the DPP and KMT, which hold distinctly different views regarding China. The 2019 protest was a great example. The protest raised Taiwan’s dire concerns over Hong Kong’s autonomy and sent out a strong signal that questioned KMT’s compromising attitude towards China. It finally crashed the craze of Han Kuo-yu and saved the DPP from its ebb in the 2020 general election.
Why is the Hong Kong issue sidelined in the election?
However, in this general election, most policy debates, not just the Hong Kong issue, have been sidelined by juicy election dramas, mainly those between the opposition presidential candidates over the last few months. From the primary of the KMT to the negotiation of a KMT-TPP joint ticket for the presidency, public attention was diverted by countless rounds of breakup and alliance rumours among the opposition powers. Therefore, the Hong Kong issue, like other policies, was never touched upon before these dramas were over.
More importantly, all political parties in Taiwan have practically little incentive to commit substantial policies to the issue proactively despite the bipartisan sympathy for Hong Kong. This was reflected by the central topic of Hong Kong affairs in Taiwan since 2019, the naturalisation arrangement for Hong Kong immigrants under the “Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong & Macao Affairs (香港澳門關係條例)”, or the “Hong Kong & Macao Act (港澳條例)”. Hongkongers as “compatriots (僑民)” in Taiwan are given a special pathway to obtain the ROC citizenship, but their “compatriot” status also disqualifies them from asylum-seeking. The success of their application is also highly subject to the discretion of the administration without clear evaluation standards. The uncertainty has become an increasingly serious issue among Hongkongers in Taiwan when more naturalisation applications by Hongkongers in Taiwan have been delayed in recent years.
As of today, almost no single party in Taiwan has made any substantial commitment in this general election to address the issue. Generally speaking, there is a bipartisan worry about the potential retaliation from China in response to any drastic change of existing Hong Kong policies in Taiwan. On top of that, a call for the opening of Hong Kong immigrants can lead to an electoral backlash and would be a low gain but high-risk move for any political party in Taiwan.
For pan-Green parties, although they showed strong solidarity with Hong Kong and electorally benefited from that in 2020, they remain exceptionally cautious when handling the immigration policy for Hongkongers mainly due to the fear of infiltration. Back in February 2023, the Tsai administration had declined the entry of two pro-democracy district councillors from Hong Kong who intended to travel to Taiwan for “national security concerns” suspiciously because they took the oath required by the NSL. Also, DPP politicians are well aware that loosening the policy can infuriate their hardcore supporters, who see that as a national security loophole. In May 2022, when the Mainland Affairs Council proposed an amendment that clarified and eased the naturalisation process for Hongkongers, some DPP lawmakers immediately jumped out and expressed all the aforementioned concerns. The proposal was finally aborted after arousing a huge controversy surrounding the issue. At the end of the day, most Hong Kong political refugees in Taiwan could only be handled through diversions to existing administrative channels with a small degree of discretion.
For the pan-blue parties, as many Hong Kong immigrants in Taiwan are there to escape the CCP influence, the pan-blue political agenda that advocates a closer tie with China might not be able to win their hearts effectively. Therefore, it is unlikely for pan-blue parties to raise the profile of a policy that might harm their electoral prospects. Although smaller parties like the Taiwan People’s Party and New Power Party proposed their versions of the Hong Kong & Macau Act amendment in 2020 to address the lack of refugee law for Hongkongers, their limited size meant they lacked the significant incentives needed to advance this agenda effectively.
Because of these concerns for different parties, the candidates could only pay lip service to the issue of Hong Kong. For example, Lai Ching-te brought up Hong Kong again in his campaign speech in Kaohsiung on 10th Dec right after Agnes Chow, a Hong Kong activist who declared publicly that she had decided to jump bail in Canada at the cost of staying away from home forever. Lai warned that they should never let Taiwan become Hong Kong, where democracy and civil liberties are gone, and some are unable to go back to their hometown. Even Ko Wen-je, who is seen to be more ambiguous towards China also shared the thought that the Hong Kong model of 1C2S “has no market in Taiwan”.
The situation might seem hopeless as Hong Kongers’ concerns were marginalised in this election. But some refuse to remain silent. At least two Hongkongers in Taiwan still try to amplify their voice in Taiwan by taking part in the elections. As a gesture to promote the representation of new settlers in Taiwan, Hong Chun-ming, the commissioner of the Taiwan State building Party’s (TSP) International Division from Hong Kong, was symbolically nominated as a candidate in TSP’s party list for the upcoming Legislative Yuan Election, even though he is not legally eligible for running due to his insufficient years of naturalisation. Meanwhile, Tsu Bai-Di, a veteran pro-democracy district councillor back in Hong Kong who obtained his ROC citizenship in 2021, also decided to run for the legislator of New Taipei City Constituency One on behalf of the Renewal Party without anticipating a win just to facilitate the socialisation and mutual understandings of Hongkongers in Taiwan. Nevertheless, given the aforementioned distractions and the nature of the Hong Kong issue in Taiwan, these efforts can hardly overturn the situation.
After all, regardless of the enduringly strong cultural and geopolitical connections between Hong Kong and Taiwan, with the distraction of dramas from the opposition powers, historical trends of Hong Kong affairs as a non-regular electoral talking point, and the limited electoral value of the Hong Kong issue for most parties in Taiwan elections, paying little attention to Hong Kong in this general election is not a surprise. However, Hong Kong will always be relevant in Taiwan’s elections, even though it is not as pivotal as in 2020. In particular, its indicative role will remain significant. Hong Kong settlers in Taiwan will also try hard to strive for a more transparent arrangement for naturalisation. Hong Kong could be a salient issue in future Taiwan elections again when the situation in Hong Kong is giving new implications to Taiwan regarding the influence of China, either good or bad. The special tie between the two places is still far from over.
Sanho Chung is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Arizona, USA. His research interests rest on clientelism, local government arrangements, and other general topics on democracy and autocracy, with a regional focus on East Asia, especially Taiwan and Hong Kong. His research outputs have appeared in the Journal of Sport and Social Issues, China Perspectives and Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal.
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