Written by Olga Daksueva.
Image credit: 2022-04-04 18.05.02 by albyantoniazzi/ Wikimedia Commons, license: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
The Russia-Ukraine war brought back discussions on national identity and how it is formed. Here I briefly discuss the results I got from comparing Taiwan and Ukraine’s paths of identity formation, presented at the conference “Taiwan in transition” at the University of Nottingham.
National identity consists of two components: ethnocultural and political. Ethno-culture is often viewed as “the core of a nation and national identity,” which includes language, history, culture, and religion. It is argued to become the pass? and to be replaced by the political component, which is designed through state sovereignty and territorial boundaries, delimiting the extent of nations and, by doing so, forming commonalities within the nations. However, the fact that we share a common territory is insufficient to get attached to the country. States also utilise various means to shape salient national identity through “rediscovery, reinterpretation and regeneration of [national] community.” Commonly shared norms, for example, democratic values and multiculturalism, can be key elements to reinforce the political dimension. Here, I will focus only on the ethnocultural component of national identity, omitting the political dimension.
I chose Taiwan and Ukraine for comparison because they share similar geopolitical constraints: external pressure from their “brother” countries and democratic transition in the late 1980s – early 1990s. As new democracies, both states lacked salient national identities and were compelled to create one to form national unity. Taiwan and Ukraine are also not mono-ethnic countries; therefore, ethnic identification and historical grievances between ethnocultural groups have played and still play a centrifugal role in shaping national identities.
In terms of ethnocultural policies, since the 1990s, Taiwanese governments focused on cultural diversification and Taiwanisation to mitigate tensions between groups and to create a certain unity in national identity. Meanwhile, ethnocultural policies in Ukraine since independence affected a large minority group – ethnic Russians, which further reinforced a gap between ethnic groups. For these reasons, I wondered to what extent ethno–cultural elements define whether or not people cultivate a Ukrainian national identity. In Taiwan, however, I expected that the ethnocultural dimension, which might have had some importance in citizens’ perception of their national identity in the 1990s, has progressively regressed and does not affect national identity today.
Ethno-cultural identities in Taiwan and Ukraine
Starting from Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, Taiwanisation aims to distinguish and separate the Taiwanese from the Chinese. These policies contributed significantly to developing multiculturalism; in particular, cultural and educational policies nurtured the feeling of belonging to Taiwan. Despite the political shift in 2000 from KMT to DPP, the ruling party continued the Taiwanisation policies, focusing on the ethnic component of national identity by replacing traditional Chinese nationalism with Taiwan-centrism. The two-decade Taiwanisation shaped a strong national identity, which survived the KMT-revised politics of Chinese nationalism when Ma Ying-jeou came to power. Social movements under Ma’s presidency, such as the Wild Strawberries Movement and the Sunflower Movement, solidified national identity while reinforcing separation from mainland China and boosting anti-China sentiments. Despite the parties’ shifts, the continuity of Taiwanisation policies contributed to the current sense of national identity. Democratisation put forward civic elements, and ethnocultural differences somehow lost their importance.
Like in Taiwan, Ukraine’s first steps of nation-building were to stimulate Ukrainisation, particularly by promoting the Ukrainian language within the education system. Certain continuity was seen in the two following decades despite the shifts between different political parties. The dominance of the Ukrainian language was present in education (more than 80% of children studied in Ukrainian), although it was not evenly spread across the country. However, the dominance of the Russian language in public administration and media remained, despite certain fluctuations of the language usage within the national government and local administrations, for example, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. Political parties before 2012 avoided regulating language usage in public life and generally accepted continuity in language ambiguity. It ended abruptly with the language law of 2012 under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, which was favourable to Russian at the expense of Ukrainian. This law was annulled in 2018, and a new language law favouring the Ukrainian language in 2019 became a “hot issue” and divisive point between Ukraine- and Russian-speaking groups. The language differences before the Russia-Ukraine war played an important role in political issues by dividing Ukrainian society.
Although both countries promoted policies that targeted rediscovering their unique history and promoting multiculturalism, Taiwanisation was more coherent, and its continuity, despite political shifts between opposite parties, ensured its success. On the contrary, Ukrainisation received more negative connotations among non-Ukrainian-speaking ethnic groups as it was seen as a way to promote the (ethnic) Ukrainian culture and language.
What lesson can we learn?
From the 1990s, Taiwan and Ukraine went through democratisation and national identity formation. New governments faced ethnocultural disaccords and grievances from the past caused by previous authoritarian regimes. In these two countries, ethnocultural differences were primarily related to the relationship with their larger neighbours, China, and Russia. Prominent ethnic minority groups, ‘Mainlanders’ in Taiwan and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, felt close to those countries and thus were willing to pursue more favourable politics toward them.
Today the situation has changed, especially in Taiwan. Despite ethnocultural differences in Taiwan, I found that all groups, including those who identify as ‘Mainlanders’ over time, have constructed a salient national identity – Taiwanese – due to the three-decade-long Taiwanisation and promotion of multiculturalism. On the Ukrainian side, cultural and education policies brought mixed results: Ukrainian was widely promoted as a state language but split society and intensified ethnocultural tensions. Furthermore, ethnocultural differences are still prominent in Ukraine, and ethnic groups are quite resilient in keeping the identity of their communities rather than aligning with a common national identity.
Taiwan’s experience in building national identity can give us a few interesting lessons. Regardless of different agendas, major political parties shared a commonality in developing an attachment to Taiwan. This consensus allowed to cultivate a Taiwanese national identity. I believe that threat perception played a crucial role as it helped consider Mainland China a threat to Taiwan’s security.
If we compare Taiwan and Ukraine concerning threat perceptions and the influence of external powers on national identity formation, we can see a dissimilarity between the two countries. Taiwanese identity is partially built on the contraposition vis-?-vis China. Beijing’s hostility enabled Taiwan to unite its population around a unique Taiwan national identity as China tested missiles around the island. China’s continuous threats to Taiwan’s safety were and still are counterproductive, as they encourage convergence and consensus on Taiwan’s sovereignty among major political parties.
On the other hand, Ukraine kept quite a close “brotherhood” relationship with Russia after declaring independence in 1991. The Russia-Ukraine relationship went up and down and hit bottom with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since the beginning of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, public opinion shifted away from proximity to Russia. It became a turning point toward wider acceptance of the Ukrainian national identity. Therefore, despite the disastrous consequences of the 2014 crisis, followed by a full-fledged Russian invasion last year, Ukraine has probably reached momentum to solidify its national identity. However, it is still a long path toward national unity as it requires bringing the society around commonly accepted and desired values.
Today ethnocultural considerations fade away in front of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. After the war, the government will face questions of economic rebuilding and societal issues, such as the return of refugees and the reintegration of currently occupied territories. It will be indispensable to emphasise national unity and access to services for all citizens regardless of their ethnocultural belonging. Combining this with reconciliation efforts, the government should grab this opportunity to mitigate misperceptions and mistrust between ethnocultural groups. Promoting indigenisation (bentuhua) ? la Taiwan may be more constructive because Ukrainisation is perceived negatively among ethnic minorities. Taiwan’s example demonstrates that multiculturalism and distinctness from external culturally close forces blur ethnocultural differences within the society. It does not mean that disputes between groups disappear; reversely, they are still present in Taiwanese society and greatly affect domestic politics. Nevertheless, despite these dissimilarities, members of each ethnocultural group develop a strong attachment to their country – Taiwan – and therefore have a strong national identity.
Olga Daksueva received her PhD degree in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. During her doctoral studies, she has been a Deputy Director / Researcher at the South China Sea Think Tank. While her doctoral research has focused on international systems during the Cold War, her broader research interests include international relations of Taiwan, China, and Russia and South China Sea disputes. More recently, Olga has become interested in a comparative analysis of national identity formation. Contact email: daksueva.olga@gmail.com.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Taiwan in Transition’.
