So far, the experts’ predictions have held true, and fragile peace endures in the region. China engaged in bellicose rhetoric ahead of Taiwan’s Jan. 13 elections, and it has increased military exercises off Taiwan’s coast (including large-scale drills designed to simulate a blockade). Last August, the United States joined Japan and South Korea in a tripartite agreement that includes efforts to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin warned, “The Asia-Pacific region … should not be turned into a boxing ring for major-power rivalry, still less a battlefield of a cold war or hot war.”

Nonetheless, 2024 began with Taiwan’s Defense Ministry announcing that it had spotted Chinese balloons in the Taiwan Strait, with one balloon crossing into Taiwanese airspace. As tensions slowly rise, it is a good time to reexamine how the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has affected the probability of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. At the time of the 2022 invasion, observers worried that the West’s failure to deter Moscow and the possibility of a quick Russian victory might encourage China to turn its sights on Taiwan. But with the war in Ukraine dragging into a third year, it’s still not clear what the European crisis means for East Asia.

To find out, we again asked the experts. From June 28 to July 12, 2023, the TRIP project asked IR scholars in the United States whether they thought the U.S. response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict—coordination with European allies to provide significant military support to Ukraine and impose sanctions against Russia—has increased or decreased the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The results reported below are based on answers from the 701 scholars. (Complete results and methodology can be found here.)

Less than 8 percent of those surveyed thought the U.S. response made a Chinese attack on Taiwan more likely. Beyond that, the experts were divided between those who believe that the U.S.-led Western response to the war in Ukraine and the costs paid by Russia will deter China and those who thought that either the U.S. response is not relevant to China’s calculations or that the fact that the U.S. supports Ukraine is balanced by the fact that it has not done more to directly defend Kyiv against Moscow’s aggression. These results show that the lessons of Russia’s war in Ukraine for Taiwan can depend on one’s interpretation of deterrence theory.

Has the U.S. Response to Russian Aggression Deterred China?

When asked how the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affects the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, IR scholars disagreed. Deterrence theory could suggest that U.S. resolve in the face of Russian actions in Ukraine should influence Chinese calculations and behavior when it comes to Taiwan. Yet respondents were almost equally divided between those who thought U.S. actions have had no consequences for Chinese intentions and actions (46.23 percent) and those who believed that U.S. behavior decreased the probability of a Chinese assault (46.52 percent).

Only 7.25 percent of survey participants believed that the U.S. response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has increased the likelihood of Chinese aggression in Taiwan.