By Sean Lin, CNA staff reporter
The swift coordinated attack on Israel by Hamas that began on Oct. 7 shocked the world and prompted discussions in Taiwan over how the island country would defend itself if China were to launch a similar attack.
In particular, experts have underlined the importance of intelligence and civil defense and offered insights into what a “saturation attack,” similar to the one by Hamas, on Taiwan, would look like.
When rockets rain down
The militant group fired more than 2,000 rockets from Gaza into Israel in about 20 minutes, overwhelming Israel’s famous Iron Dome air defense system.
“The threat of a rocket attack [on Taiwan] is real,” said Chieh Chung (揭仲), an associate research fellow with the National Policy Foundation in Taipei, citing two reasons.
First, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been deploying rockets with a range of 150-300 kilometers, which can reach Taiwan’s west coast, Chieh said.
Additionally, he said that during the large-scale military exercises China staged around Taiwan in August 2022 in retaliation to then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the PLA fired rockets into a maritime zone near the median line of the Taiwan Strait, to demonstrate its ability to carry out such an attack.
“When the number of incoming rockets reaches a certain level in a certain amount of time, no surface-to-air missile system can intercept them all. Taiwan’s MIM-104 Patriot and Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems are no different,” Chieh said.
As such, he said, the assets most in need of protection would need to be prioritized to ensure they would not be paralyzed by a saturation attack involving PLA missiles or rockets, while civilian casualties would be “inevitable.”
Lin Ying-yu (林穎佑), an assistant professor at the Tamkang University Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, agreed that it would be impossible to intercept all incoming rockets or missiles in the event of a saturation attack.
He said what should be focused on is how to preserve and relocate troops and other key military assets so the country’s armed forces can continue fighting.
Protecting the public
The prospect of Taiwan being hit by a barrage of rockets has also highlighted the issue of air raid shelters in the country.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Wang Ting-yu (王定宇) broached the issue of the public not being aware of shelter locations and how to access them with Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) during an interpellation on Oct. 12.
Currently, information regarding the shelters is only accessible through scanning a QR code located in an online file named “All-Out Defense Handbook,” and Wang said that not everybody knows how to do so.
To tackle this problem, Chieh recommended that agencies assign air raid shelters to be used by residents in a borough or township depending on their house numbers, with borough or village chiefs responsible for going door-to-door to deliver such information.
“Sometimes, the old way is the best way,” he said.
Chieh also recommended conducting annual or biannual evacuation drills that require residents to enter their assigned air-raid shelter — something that is not covered in Taiwan’s Wan An air raid drills — to help them become familiarized with the route.
Ho Cheng-hui (何澄輝), CEO of the privately-run civil defense education institution Kuma Academy, said although the nation has designated enough locations to act as air raid shelters, it was doubtful how many would be functional if an enemy attack occurred.
Under Taiwan’s laws regarding shelters and evacuating during an airstrike, legal residential buildings with a basement are meant to be considered air raid shelters, but this has presented a host of problems, Ho said.
“Say you’re walking along the street and the air raid siren is sounded, but the nearest building to you is a luxury condominium. Would the caretaker let you in?” he asked.
“Is the basement of your building easily accessible? Does it have a generator to power ventilators? Is it stocked with food, water, and medical equipment? What if you live on the 13th floor?” he continued.
“None of these issues are addressed in the regulations, which is a big problem,” Ho said.
Viability of a Chinese invasion
Regarding the concern that the United States could become militarily involved in the Israel-Hamas war, thus presenting China with the opportunity to invade Taiwan, Lin said he did not see a direct link between the two scenarios.
“The decision to attack, or not attack, depends on PLA’s capabilities. It does not matter whether there is a conflict between Israel and Palestine,” he said.
In addition, recent reports of the arrests of former PLA Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao (李玉超) and his sitting and former deputies on charges of corruption, as well as the disappearance of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福), have likely impacted PLA morale, which in turn reduces the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan, Lin said.
Li Shangfu has not been seen in public since Aug. 29. According to media reports, he has been under investigation and is suspected of the corrupt procurement of military equipment while he was head of the Chinese Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department.
Echoing Lin, Chieh said the PLA currently lacked what it would take to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan, but he has concerns that the U.S.’ focus on Israel-Hamas war could potentially compromise stability in the Taiwan Strait.
To take Taiwan, he said, the PLA would need to be able to secure a “quick victory” in its “first battle” against Taiwan’s armed forces, adding that it was still building up its capabilities to be able to do so.
Chieh also noted that the U.S. had deployed the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean to assist Israel and to prevent any expansion of the conflict, in particular the possibility of Iranian and Syrian militant groups aligned with Hamas joining the fight.
In a statement on Oct. 8, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he had directed the Ford carrier strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Pentagon has also taken steps to augment U.S. Air Force F-35, F-15, F-16, and A-10 fighter aircraft squadrons in the region, Austin said.
On Oct. 15, Austin announced that he had ordered the deployment of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean, to deter others from joining the conflict as Israel prepares to expand its ground operations in Gaza.
According to CNN, which cited an unnamed defense official, it is, however, unclear how long the Ford will stay in the region once the Eisenhower carrier strike group arrives.
Chieh said that while he did not believe that China would change the status quo in the Western Pacific by force and risk a direct confrontation with the U.S., he was worried that Washington pivoting its military deployments away from the Western Pacific region could embolden China’s campaign of military intimidation in regions in which it is engaged in territorial disputes with other countries, including Taiwan, because this increases the risk of skirmishes, which could lead to conflicts.
The power of intelligence
After the Hamas attack on Israel, another focus of discussions has been the crucial role of intelligence in preparing for an attack and how Israel seemed to have had an “intelligence failure.”
Asked to comment on the issue, Lin and Ho both said the problem with Israel’s intelligence system was not its ability to gather information, but with analyzing information and making decisions based on the intelligence it has.
“Mossad (Israel’s intelligence and special operations institute) must have received relevant information but misinterpreted it, which in turn caused it to make wrong decisions,” Lin said.
In the same vein, Lin said that while Taiwan can quickly obtain intelligence on the PLA, its development, and movements, whether top intelligence officials will be able to form an accurate judgment from it will depend on the country’s understanding of the PLA, which underscores the importance of PLA studies.
Over the years, gathering intelligence on Palestine has very much constituted Israel looking through a “one-way mirror,” and this may have caused it to become overconfident in its ability to process the data and in turn neglect signs it should have been more wary about, including changes in communications and planning methods, Ho said.
In Taiwan’s case, he said, its intelligence agencies are plagued by problems more serious than those of their Israeli counterparts because he has yet to see any of Taiwan’s intelligence and government agencies collate intelligence about Chinese politics, military, or the economy, let alone utilize it to form effective responses.
Chieh, meanwhile, said that because invading Taiwan would be a massive operation and require large-scale mobilization of troops, vehicles and ships, the PLA has formulated plans to speed up the process, including teaming up with logistics companies and incorporating artificial intelligence to assist with necessary changes in deployments.
As such, it is important that Taiwan can obtain intelligence on the PLA at the earliest opportunity so it can conduct any necessary mobilizations to respond to an imminent attack, he said.
Civil defense in peacetime
The early obtaining of intelligence would also aid civil defense efforts — such as mobilizing reservists, assigning medical personnel, and moving civilians to safety — allowing them to be made before rather than after an attack like in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Chieh said.
Ho pointed out that the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia shows that as wars become protracted, civil defense plays a prominent role that has evolved from its traditional definition of concentrating all efforts on supporting the military.
Nowadays, civil defense is also responsible for helping society develop resilience and encompasses efforts to ensure the continued stable operation of society after it has come under attack, to bring about speedy economic recovery, to treat people experiencing trauma, and to counter cyberattacks, cognitive warfare, and disinformation campaigns, he said.
To ensure these functions during wartime, preparations should be made during peaceful times, he said.
“So far, Taiwan’s civil defense system has neglected increasing social resilience,” he said. “We need to rethink and review civil defense and overhaul the entire system. This will be a great challenge for Taiwan.”
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