Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te’s victory in Saturday’s presidential election might initially seem like a rebuke to China and a sign that the island is drifting more toward the United States. But a closer look reveals a more complicated picture. The Taiwanese people showed they are not interested in becoming a pawn of either superpower. The U.S. approach to Taiwan over the next four years must be centered on this reality.
To be sure, China tried to prevent Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from achieving a third consecutive term in office and favored the opposition. But Beijing is content to play a long game. Chinese President Xi Jinping told President Biden last November that China intends to reunify with Taiwan eventually but that there is no set date. Even though Lai, who is also known as William Lai, and the DPP have repeatedly said they have no intention of seeking formal independence, Lai’s presidency might be seen as an irritant in the fragile relations between Washington and Beijing. No wonder Biden’s reaction to the election was to issue a statement assuring the world that the United States does “not support Taiwan’s independence.”
In Washington, Taiwan is often viewed solely through the lens of the U.S.-China relationship. But that frame risks missing the message Taiwan sent this weekend. The election results show that the Taiwanese people care more about domestic issues than great-power competition. They want to strengthen ties with the United States, but they don’t want to abandon ties with China. U.S. policymakers should be humble about the implications of the polls and prepared for what comes next.
“This election was less about what’s happening externally and more about what’s happening internally in Taiwan,” Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, told me.
Lai won just over 40 percent of the vote, which means that almost 60 percent of Taiwanese voters wanted change at the top. There is incumbency fatigue in Taiwan and a general dissatisfaction with the DPP’s handling of several domestic issues, including the economy, jobs and housing prices. If the two opposition parties — the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party — had been more competent or more unified, the result could have been different. Also, the DPP lost control of Taiwan’s parliament to the Kuomintang. Leading a divided government, Lai will need to seek consensus to govern.
In Washington, most Taiwan analysis focuses on whether China will invade the island and when. Some say 2025, others say 2027. But by fixating on the military attack scenario, U.S. policymakers risk ignoring what the Taiwanese people actually care about and overlooking the various other ways China is putting the squeeze on Taiwan.
“There’s a hyper-focused attention on the military dimensions of deterring the Chinese regime and not enough attention given to the economic and political elements of strengthening deterrence and enhancing resilience,” Hsiao said.
China is likely to continue using economic coercion and its huge market power to pressure Taiwan’s business community to be more Beijing-friendly. Lai says he wants to diversify Taiwan’s economic relationships, but U.S. initiatives to strengthen trade with the island have been lackluster.
Meanwhile, Beijing is continuing efforts to sever Taiwan from its last remaining diplomatic allies. On Monday, the small Pacific island country of Nauru announced it was cutting ties with Taipei and switching its diplomatic recognition to Beijing. That leaves Taiwan with only 12 diplomatic allies remaining. U.S. policy is to help Taiwan keep those relationships, but it’s not working.
China is also using many nonmilitary tactics to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and mess with the Taiwanese people’s minds. This includes massive amounts of political interference, cyberattacks, disinformation and pressure on Taiwanese of all stripes to toe the reunification line — or face harassment and punishment.
“China is engaged in constant political warfare and lawfare against Taiwan,” Randall Schriver, a former State Department and Pentagon official, told me. “There’s been a lot of focus on the military piece and defining deterrence as countering an invasion, when in fact deterrence should be looked at in a much broader framework.”
Military assistance is an important part of helping Taiwan, but only one part. And when the only solution you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. It’s easy to talk about selling Taiwan more tanks or fighter jets. Discussing a free-trade agreement is hard; figuring out how to combat Chinese Communist Party disinformation and cyberwarfare efforts is harder still. These are also battlefields for Taiwan if it wants to preserve its autonomy and succeed as a country, but U.S. policy can’t keep up.
U.S. leaders should also see Taiwan’s election as a clear sign that Washington should strengthen ties with all of Taiwan’s parties, not just the DPP. Beijing has chosen only one side of Taiwan’s political realm to engage with, but there’s no reason the United States should make the same mistake. In any healthy democracy, the opposition will someday become the government.
The Taiwanese people don’t want to be ruled from Beijing, but they also don’t want conflict. By supporting Taiwan’s democratic development, promoting its economic prosperity and protecting its international diplomatic space, the United States can craft a strategy that enables Taiwan to engage Beijing from a position of relative confidence and strength. That’s the best way to keep Taiwan free and avoid war.