On January 13, 2024, Taiwan witnessed its leadership election, resulting in the victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates William Lai and Hsiao Mei-chin. Lai secured 40.05% of the votes, while Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou You-yi received 33.49%, and Taiwan’s People Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je obtained 26.46%. This outcome indicates a complete failure of the KMT-TPP coalition’s goal to oust the DPP.
Despite a nearly 60% “disapproval rate,” the DPP achieved a historic third leadership term, breaking the established power rotation pattern. However, the KMT gained a slim one-seat advantage over the DPP in the Legislative Yuan’s 113 seats. This shift may pose challenges to the DPP’s governance, with the TPP, holding a mere 8 seats, potentially influencing legislative dynamics.
Looking at the current situation, some observations can be made concerning the development of Taiwan.
Firstly, the KMT’s once-dominant position in Taiwan is undergoing a gradual and persistent decline that is poised to continue. Despite the DPP experiencing a notable dip in approval ratings and grappling with various governance challenges, the KMT’s failure to secure the election underscores its inability to align with prevailing political currents. The KMT’s support base predominantly comprises the elderly, lacking resonance with the younger generation—a clear indication of its ongoing marginalization. This trend has been discernible for several years, reflecting a gradual decline in the KMT’s influence that may intensify in the medium to long term.
Secondly, the DPP, which has long held sway in Taiwan’s political landscape, has evolved into a “mature party”. Nevertheless, this once grassroots and influential entity is presently grappling with substantial governance challenges. Internal corruption and a deficiency in administrative capabilities stand out as its primary vulnerabilities. The noteworthy decline in the election’s approval rating, plummeting to a mere 40%, reflects public discontent with the DPP’s governance. The DPP’s victory in this election was contingent on the decline of the KMT and the KMT-TPP coalition’s failure. The DPP’s future resurgence remains uncertain, and it depends on its resolution of persisting issues, as well as the improvement in administrative efficiency. Failure to address these concerns may propel the party into further decline.
Noteworthily, the ascent of the TPP, founded by Ko Wen-je, constitutes a pivotal development in Taiwan’s political landscape. Established in 2019, the TPP, led by Ko Wen-je in his inaugural bid for the island’s leadership, garnered substantial support, securing 26.46%. This achievement underscores a swiftly escalating influence, positioning the TPP as the “third force” in Taiwan’s political arena. Ko’s political perspectives and vision resonate significantly, particularly with the younger generation and the educated class, constituting over 80% of his supporters in this election. As the ranks of centrist voters disenchanted with both the DPP and the KMT camps swell in recent years, they have increasingly rallied behind Ko. His meteoric rise has effectively established a groundbreaking political equilibrium, heralding a momentous milestone in Taiwan’s political evolution.
Ko is a knowledge-based individual with the characteristics of an internet celebrity. lacks the traditional political party organizational background, emerging from a medical profession. Despite this, in today’s climate, individuals gaining popularity in cyberspace often attract organized support. It has become common for politicians in this era to master social media for effective political engagement. The TPP, led by Ko, is expected to evolve from the third force to a major player in Taiwanese politics. Ko’s goal in this election was not immediate victory but laying the groundwork for the 2028 election. Successful results in his first candidacy set the stage for the TPP’s transformation over the next four years into a collective party, emphasizing principles, political views, and organizational capabilities while fostering grassroots connections.
In addition, the opposition to “reunification” in Taiwan’s political arena is expected to strengthen. The three major parties—DPP, KMT, and TPP—fundamentally reject “reunification”, each with varying degrees and approaches. While the DPP’s stance is more overt, both the KMT and TPP also possess similar sentiments.
The future relations between Taiwan and mainland China will be significantly shaped by U.S.-China dynamics. The victory of DPP’s Lai raises concerns in both China and the U.S. about heightened risks in the Taiwan Strait under his leadership. China will carefully observe Lai’s actions, potentially leading to collaborative risk management efforts between China and the U.S. to uphold the existing cross-strait status quo. This alignment is in line with U.S. interests. However, the concept of “China-U.S. joint risk management” is sensitive and vulnerable to potential disruptions arising from shifts in bilateral relations and the outcomes of U.S. elections. If the Biden administration remains in power, there is a greater chance of preserving the status quo. Conversely, a return of Trump could introduce uncertainties, given his background and the uncertainty surrounding the U.S.’s willingness to engage in military conflict.
The likelihood of the Taiwan Strait situation escalating into a war due to strained relations seems low at present. If a conflict were to erupt, it might not be easily contained, potentially involving not only China and the U.S. but also other regional players like Japan and the Philippines. China considers the Taiwan issue a core interest and a “red line,” as demonstrated by military encirclement after Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022. Given the high costs and consequences of crossing China’s bottom line, all sides are likely to approach the situation in the Taiwan Strait with caution and rationality.