TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — With less than one month until Taiwan’s next general election, the policy platforms of the presidential candidates and their parties are coming into focus.
While Taiwan’s presidential candidates share many similarities in international and cross-strait policy, there are also some major differences. Below is a summary of how Taiwan’s three main political parties plan to approach cross-strait and international relations, if in power after the election.
Information on the Kuomintang (KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) policies provided below is based on past statements made by the parties’ leaders and published policies.
Kuomintang
During KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih’s (侯友宜) trip to the U.S. in September, he published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he outlined a cross-strait policy focusing on “3 Ds”: “deterrence, dialogue, and de-escalation.” In the article, Hou said that deterrence would be achieved by boosting Taiwan’s military strength.
For deterrence, Hou first said he would raise the monthly salaries of those who volunteer to be in the army. It has since been announced that the increase will be between NT$2,000 and NT$10,000 per month.
Hou also said he wants to develop asymmetric combat capabilities, including continuing to promote domestic production of submarines, and improving drones and anti-drone capabilities.
Howard Shen (沈正浩), foreign policy advisor to Hou and the KMT’s deputy head of U.S. affairs, published an article in The Diplomat on Dec. 14 that expanded on Hou’s previous statements. In it, he said that in addition to pay increases for troops and “expediting the conscription waitlist,” the KMT would also prioritize “ten major development projects for deterrence.”
According to Shen, the ten deterrence projects include developing asymmetric capabilities that are “mobile, stealth, intelligent, small-in-size, large-in-quantity,” and streamlining network-centric warfare capabilities. Cybersecurity infrastructure would be improved, as would combat equipment.
Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine is pictured at its launch in September. (CNA photo)
Continuing, Shen said that Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program would be extended. The amount of military spending would be linked to the level of perceived threat, Shen wrote.
Shen also said that if elected, the KMT would release a “Republic of China National Security Strategy” within 10 months. The strategy would cover cross-strait relations, foreign policy, and other social issues that relate to national defense, such as Taiwan’s declining birth rate.
Hou has indicated that he would like to see trade with China increase. He has also spoken positively about resuming negotiations on the controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which triggered mass protests when Taiwan first tried to ratify it in 2014.
When asked about the CSSTA on Sunday, Hou said that Taiwan “shouldn’t put all of its eggs in one basket,” but should at least put some “in the largest basket beside it.”
In terms of dialogue with China, in July Hou said that he backs the 1992 consensus in line with the constitution of the Republic of China. He said the consensus means an agreement that there is only one China, but that both sides of the Taiwan Strait have different interpretations as to what that means, reflecting a long-held KMT position.
During an interview with CTS on Sunday, Hou said it was okay for the governments of Taiwan and China to interpret the 1992 consensus differently. He also reiterated his opposition to Taiwan’s independence and said he was also against China’s “one country, two systems” governance model, used by Beijing to govern Hong Kong and Macau.
On international relations, Hou has indicated he would continue to promote the New Southbound Policy, launched by the current Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) administration. He has also said he would seek to deepen connections with other democracies, establish a committee for technology and trade, and pursue Taiwan’s joining of the CPTPP trade agreement.
Hou Yu-ih shakes hands with his running mate Jaw Shaw-kong. (CNA photo)
Democratic Progressive Party
In July, Taiwan’s current vice president and DPP candidate Lai Ching-te (賴清德) outlined his vision for cross-strait policy, also publishing a piece in foreign media. In the Wall Street Journal op-ed, Lai outlined a four-point plan that began with continuing to build defense capability.
Lai wrote that if elected, he would continue defense spending increases and conscription reform that began under Tsai. Like Hou, Lai also said he would seek to build the asymmetric warfare capabilities of Taiwan’s military.
Further, Lai said he would increase cooperation with international partners in the areas of “training, force restructuring, civil defense, and information sharing.”
As mentioned above, the current DPP-led government announced in late 2022 that it would extend the mandatory military service period from four months to one year beginning in January 2024. In November, Lai said that he supports the extension, but has no plans to make further extensions to the one-year period.
Unlike Hou, Lai has said multiple times that he believes an overreliance on China for trade constitutes a national security risk. In the Wall Street Journal piece, he wrote that Taiwan should support local industries, and “foster secure supply chains while pursuing trade agreements that encourage trade diversification.”
Lai opposes ratifying the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China, and in September framed the election as one that would decide the fate of Taiwan’s industries. He opposes the agreement on the belief that Taiwan’s service sector businesses could not compete with Chinese businesses if they were allowed market access.
Like Hou, Lai said he would strengthen relationships with democracies around the world.
Protestors demonstrated against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement when Taiwan’s government first tried to ratify it in 2014. (Wikimedia Commons photo)
Regarding talks with China, Lai said he would engage in dialogue only if there were no preconditions. He said dialogue with China should be conducted on “the principles of reciprocity and dignity.”
Lai has rejected suggestions that he would seek Taiwan’s formal independence, and said in his inaugural press conference as a presidential candidate that “Taiwanese society should unite with the Republic of China, Taiwan.”
“The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and the future of the Republic of China, Taiwan, must be decided by the people living in Taiwan,” he said.
On international relations, Lai’s campaign outlined a plan in October to develop a global presence for Taiwan that said Lai would follow in President Tsai’s footsteps, and seek bilateral investment agreements in the Indo-Pacific region.
Lai would also seek to build industrial parks and “entrepreneur centers” in the Indo-Pacific region, also building the latter in Japan, the U.S., and Europe. The document also said a Lai administration would seek more bi-or-multilateral trade agreements, and to join the CPTPP trade agreement.
Lai Ching-te shakes hands with his running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim. (CNA photo)
Taiwan People’s Party
Ko Wen-je’s (柯文哲) TPP released a policy in late December that outlined plans to increase Taiwan’s defense spending to 3% of gross domestic product, and six points for military reform. The points include improving the military’s combat readiness, more specialization, additional public oversight, building information warfare capabilities, and modernization.
The party would also work to decentralize the military’s management, which it said would allow for smaller, more independent combat units. It also expressed the importance of investment and public-private partnerships for defense.
On cross-strait interaction, the policy stated that Taiwan is a leading example of the integration of Chinese culture and universal values. “Taiwan should actively influence mainland China through the platform of shared Chinese culture to facilitate China’s values aligning with universal values,” it read.
The policy refers to democracy, human rights, and environmental governance when describing these “universal values.” On economic integration, the TPP also said it would seek to diversify trade and expand Taiwan’s overseas markets, while also exploring new avenues for cross-strait economic cooperation.
Ko Wen-je (right) and running mate Cynthia Wu wave to media. (CNA photo)
Rumors that the TPP intended to resume the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement if elected (CSSTA) surfaced in June, to which Ko responded by saying he had never publicly mentioned the issue. During a press conference in July, Ko reiterated that he never mentioned the resumption of talks on the CSSTA. However, at the same time, he suggested that completing work on cross-strait trade regulations was a step on the path to opening cross-strait services trade.
On Dec. 6 Ko said he would follow President Tsai’s approach when it comes to international relations. In the same media appearance, he confounded some by stating that he was strongly on the side of the DPP at heart, though added that if elected, he would take a more conciliatory approach to China than the DPP had.
On Taiwan’s sovereignty, Ko said he would seek to maintain the cross-strait status quo, and said it was the only choice Taiwan had. “The U.S. won’t let Taiwan unify with China and China won’t let Taiwan become independent,” he said.
On the 1992 consensus, Ko said that the idea had been stigmatized and that debates over the consensus were simply over terminology. “Should we change the name of the term?” he mused during a Bloomberg interview in September.
