Written by T.Y. Wang.
Image credit: Public domain.
In the January 13 presidential and legislative elections, citizens of Taiwan elected Mr Lai Ching-te of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the next president of the island country, handing the DPP an unprecedented third straight term of presidency. In a three-way race, Lai was elected with 40% of the votes. The DPP also lost its majority control of the Legislative Yuan and won only 51 seats, down from the current 63 seats. The incoming Lai administration is likely to confront an alignment of the opposition Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), holding 52 and eight seats, respectively, in the 113-member legislature. Lai’s victory, nevertheless, is a rebuke to Beijing’s sovereignty claim of the island and a hard pill for Chinese leaders to swallow. In the aftermath of the election, observers are pondering how Beijing will react to Taiwan’s electoral outcomes.
Chinese leaders view Lai as a “separatist,” and his affiliated DPP is a secessionist political party. A win by Lai, in their mind, means Taipei will continue its policy of pursuing Taiwan independence in spite of Lai’s pledge to continue the incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen’s policy of maintaining the status quo. Prior to the election, Beijing had magnified a “war and peace” narrative, intensified its military and economic pressure on Taiwan and warned the island citizens to make a “correct choice” in the elections. The electoral results may give comfort to Chinese leaders that Lai is a minority president with 3 million fewer votes than Tsai’s landslide victory four years ago, and his party failed to clinch a majority in Taiwan’s legislature. In its first comment on Taiwan’s elections, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated that the DPP “does not represent mainstream opinion on the island.” Lai’s victory, nevertheless, has deepened Communist leaders’ anxiety about their dream of unifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.
While Beijing’s responses to Taiwan’s electoral results will be clearer in the coming months before Lai’s inauguration in May, they are likely to fall into three categories: diplomatic isolation, economic coercion and military intimidation. Beijing’s initial reaction in the aftermath of the elections appeared to be calm, issuing a statement on its long-standing opposition to Taiwan’s independence, but its diplomatic response was swift. Just two days after the elections, China lured Nauru away as Taiwan’s ally. The South Pacific state has become the 10th country that switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing since the DPP’s last presidential victory in 2016, leaving only 12 nations that officially recognise Taiwan and most of them being small and internationally insignificant. The Communist government may continue its tactics of diplomatic isolation by further peeling off Taipei’s few remaining diplomatic allies and preventing Taiwan from participating in any international organisations.
Meanwhile, cross-strait economic exchanges have expanded substantially during the past several decades, particularly when former President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was in office. As China becomes one of Taiwan’s top trading and investment partners, Beijing has used trade, investment, and tourism to integrate the island’s economy with China’s. By deepening cross-Strait economic ties, Beijing hopes that it may influence Taipei’s policies from within and create a favourable environment for its cause of unification. In response, the Tsai administration launched the New Southbound Policy in 2016 to broaden Taiwan’s economic engagement with countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, attempting to reduce the island’s economic dependence on the Chinese market. Despite the cold and tense cross-strait relationship during Tsai’s 8-year presidency, the volume of Taiwan’s imports and exports with the Chinese mainland continued to take more than one-fifth of its total external trade. The close economic relationship has provided Beijing with leverage against Taipei. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, for instance, the Chinese government suspended tariff reduction on imports of twelve Taiwanese petrochemical products, which enjoyed reduced tariffs under the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Beijing also threatened to take further steps against other Taiwanese products, including agriculture and fishery, as most farmers live in southern Taiwan, which is a stronghold of the DPP. It is expected that such tactics of economic coercion are likely to continue and intensify in the coming months in order to create pressure on Taiwan’s economy and weaken popular support for the DPP government.
On the military front, observers generally agree that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan is not imminent. Even though China has a substantial military advantage over Taiwan, there are considerable challenges for Beijing to launch a full-scale invasion across the Taiwan Strait. An attack on Taiwan is particularly risky, considering that Taipei, with the help from Washington, has enhanced its asymmetric warfare capability in recent years. As a quick victory is not guaranteed, Beijing will have to confront the possibility of America’s military intervention. In particular, the Biden administration’s effort to internationalising the Taiwan issue has built a coalition that sees a cross-Strait military conflict as an important issue for them. Wording like “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”, has been mentioned at the U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, Australia-Japan and G7 summits. Some of these countries are prepared for direct military intervention, while others are more ready to help counter Beijing’s aggressive actions. Even the G7 has made it clear that they would employ sanctions in order to stop China’s aggressive actions against Taiwan. Thus, below the threshold of a Normandy-like invasion, Beijing may intensify its current “grey zone” tactics like conducting blockade-style military drills near Taiwan, sending warplanes and naval vessels across the median line of the Taiwan Strait and further closer to the island, or launching missiles over Taiwan to show its military strength. These activities may strain Taiwan’s armed forces, demoralise the island citizens, and sow the public’s doubt about the island country’s military capability and readiness. It could also undermine Taipei’s ability to differentiate the “routine” operations of the People’s Liberation Army and an imminent attack.
Beijing is also likely to reach out to other Taiwanese political parties, civic groups, and local officials bypassing the Taipei government, as it has been doing in the past. The goals of such United Front tactics are to win Taiwan citizens’ hearts and minds and isolate “separatists” like Lai. Because few on the island support Taiwan’s unification with China, it is doubtful how effective Beijing’s United Front tactic will be.
In sum, when Lai takes office in May for a four-year term, he will be confronted by a tough political scene about how to deal with a menacing China. Even though he moderated his pro-independence stand and pledged to continue President Tsai’s policies of strengthening military defence, deepening relationships with the U.S. and other countries, and avoiding conflict with China, he will face the stiff challenges of keeping Taiwan’s economy prosperous and its citizens safe from Beijing’s military threat.
Dr T.Y. Wang is a University Professor and Department Chair of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, USA. He currently serves as the co-editor of the Journal of Asian and African Studies and is the co-editor of the Taiwan Voter.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘What does the 2024 Taiwan election tell us?’.
