On 13 January, Taiwan will hold its much-anticipated presidential election held every four years. Many people are travelling to Taiwan to watch the election as if it’s a long-awaited festival. Some jokingly said that if they were to miss this election, there might not be another chance to witness such a spectacle again.
Rise of Ko among youths
In comparison with the tense political situation in past years, the atmosphere surrounding the 2024 elections is relatively mild, with the traditional opposition between reunification and independence giving way to an intergenerational divide.
With the opinion polls closed and no new statistics to steer the narrative, one can clearly sense the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP)’s Ko Wen-je in this three-way race. Considered by elders from both the Blue and Green camps as a “fraud”, Ko is nevertheless a politician who has won the support of many youths.
At the time of writing, Ko’s YouTube channel has amassed more than one million subscribers; five times that of William Lai, and 30 times that of Hou Yu-ih. During his campaign trail in southern Taiwan last weekend, even though the number of supporters who attended Ko’s event was lesser than that of his opponents, the number of views online reached a staggering 110,000 views.
… they [the youths of Taiwan] are unhappy about the current situation, and have very clear attitudes and wants when it comes to social issues such as housing justice, corruption, low pay, educational reform, energy shortage and political trustworthiness.
Ko Wen-je (centre), Taiwan presidential candidate from the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) arrives at Miaokou Night Market in Keelung on 10 January 2024. (I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)
Behind this figure are the youths of Taiwan — this is their way of revolting against how politics in Taiwan has been traditionally presented. These youths do not want grassroots organisations; they do not want to be on buses headed for campaign events; they do not want to attend such events just for the sake of a free meal.
Indeed, they are unhappy about the current situation, and have very clear attitudes and wants when it comes to social issues such as housing justice, corruption, low pay, educational reform, energy shortage and political trustworthiness.
Shift of focus towards internal affairs and social policies
How exactly has Ko risen to prominence? The answer may have something to do with Tsai Ing-wen.
From the Ma Ying-jeou era onwards, the Taiwan people’s identity has gradually shifted to one that is increasingly localised, with the Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill protests accelerating this change. The shift in identity has in turn spurred how Taiwanese society views its political system.
Under such circumstances, the traditional cross-strait policy supporters have gradually been marginalised, while the “two-state theory” has become a quietly accepted consensus among most of the Taiwanese public. Yet, the two-state theory is at odds with the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), especially in terms of whether there is a need for a constitutional reform to address the conflict between ROC sovereignty and governance.
But if constitutional reform is undertaken, the bottom line maintaining the status quo between the two sides of the strait would be undermined, and Taiwan will not be able to handle the risk that follows.
Such a backdrop led Tsai Ing-wen to propose the “four commitments” during her term in office: “Let us here renew with one another our enduring commitment to a free and democratic constitutional system, our commitment that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other, our commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty, and our commitment that the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people.”
This approach found a grey area between the ROC constitution and the Democratic Progressive Party’s “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” by stressing that both sides of the strait are not subordinate to each other. It also adroitly sidestepped the controversial issue of constitutional reform, while providing a new definition for the nature of Taiwan’s polity.
This strategy has proven to be effective in consolidating mass public support, and politicians — including Lai — have no choice but to follow this trend.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen speaks during an election campaign rally of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at the New Taipei City Xinzhuang Civil Sports Center in New Taipei City on 6 January 2024. (Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP)
The four commitments not only changed Taiwan’s political discourse but also indirectly shifted the focus of the election from cross-strait relations to internal affairs and social policies. Just as a house needs a strong foundation to support its beams, a society’s consensus on the nature of its polity provides the foundation for more constructive policy discussions.
… with Ko’s image of integrity and diligence, as well as his deep concern for domestic issues, he has naturally become a ray of hope for youths who are critical of the status quo.
Lack of firm and unified political identity
Looking back on past elections, cross-strait relations have always been an unshakeable topic in Taiwan that often polarises Taiwanese society. The lack of a firm and unified political identity prevents people from shifting their focus from divisive political issues to more constructive public policies and a more comprehensive assessment of the government’s effectiveness.
The history of developmental states in East Asia illustrates that economic growth under authoritarianism ultimately facilitates the transition into a welfare state. Taiwan’s situation is unique — before Tsai put forth the four commitments, Taiwanese society had long been split about the nature of the island’s polity.
On such a divided political foundation, the ruling party often tends to skew social benefits in favour of supporters who take extreme positions on reunification or independence, especially the elderly and specific classes of people with vested interests.
Following the proposal of the four commitments, Taiwan’s social identity became clearer and more tangible. The younger generation started to have the chance to move away from the longstanding dilemma between reunification and independence and instead focus on issues directly related to their own lives.
Taiwan’s political landscape will shift from a battle between reunification and independence to a new era of intergenerational rivalry.
Supporters hold signs saying “Taiwan needs you, give our children a bright future” at an election campaign rally of Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) in Keelung, Taiwan, on 10 January 2024. (I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)
However, under the rotating rule of the Blue and Green parties, social problems such as soaring home prices, unequal income distribution, the lack of political ethics, lies and corruption still exist, with most campaign promises remaining unfulfilled.
As a result, the well-being and quality of life of the younger generation have not improved as expected. In contrast, with Ko’s image of integrity and diligence, as well as his deep concern for domestic issues, he has naturally become a ray of hope for youths who are critical of the status quo.
Challenge to mainland China’s reunification strategy
Statistics show that younger voters are far more supportive of Ko than older voters. Over 50% of voters are under 50, forming the voter base of Ko in the upcoming election. Following the changes in the age distribution of voters, the TPP is destined to see the rise of its generation of supporters. If it is able to gain over 25% of votes or higher, it would imply that Taiwan’s political landscape will shift from a battle between reunification and independence to a new era of intergenerational rivalry.
Political developments in Malaysia, Thailand and elsewhere in recent years suggest that Taiwan’s generational showdown is becoming inevitable, a development that poses a potential challenge to mainland China’s pursuit of reunification.
… the united front strategy that Beijing has long relied on will also face a serious test: the mainland may no longer be able to selectively tie itself to the ideologies of a particular political party in Taiwan…
People stand near a giant propaganda slogan which reads “One Country, Two Systems, Reunify China”, which can be seen from Taiwan’s Kinmen island, on a sidewalk on the waterfront in Xiamen, Fujian province, China, on 10 January 2024, days before Taiwan’s presidential election. (Greg Baker/AFP)
If subsequent elections in Taiwan show that domestic issues can take precedence over the conflict between reunification and independence, mainland China’s strategy of polarising Taiwanese society through the perception of Taiwan’s political system will be significantly weakened.
At the same time, the united front strategy that Beijing has long relied on will also face a serious test: the mainland may no longer be able to selectively tie itself to the ideologies of a particular political party in Taiwan, but will need to directly confront mainstream public opinion and social consensus in Taiwan. Yet, it is almost certain that the mainland will never accept the legitimisation of the “two-state theory” under the framework of the four commitments.
Thus, regardless of the election results this year, tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the possibility of war over Taiwan look set to remain, casting a long and dark shadow over cross-strait relations.
Related: DPP and KMT: Who will be the largest political party in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan? [Big read] No cross-strait policy to appease all parties in Taiwan’s presidential race
