Over the last four years, there have been a series of clashes between the ground forces of the People’s Liberation Army and India’s defenders in the Himalayas. Despite substantial logistical and other material advantages, Chinese soldiers have performed poorly in combat.
The ground forces are unlikely to lead actions against the likely targets of Taiwan, the Philippines, or Japan, but the unexpectedly bad performance in the Himalayas raises a critical question: can the world’s largest military, China’s PLA, win wars?
As an initial matter, it’s evident that the leadership of the Chinese military is in turmoil.
Turmoil is the almost inevitable result of the PLA reporting to the Communist Party of China, through the Party’s Central Military Commission. Its status as a party army means the Chinese officer corps is even less professional than counterparts in most other countries.
The political masters of the PLA have been especially vigilant in exerting control after Marshall Lin Biao’s attempted coup against Mao Zedong in 1971. “The Party commands the gun,” Mao’s phrase, or similar statements are often seen in official pronouncements. There are, as in many militaries in communist states, two reporting lines in China, and the political one is more important than the military chain of command.
Politics are now consuming China’s senior officers. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post reported at the end of last month that five current or former commanders of the Rocket Force were removed from both the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and from China’s top legislative body itself.
Last year, the top two officers of the Rocket Force, which controls almost all of China’s nuclear weapons, were replaced. At least 70 in that branch have disappeared in recent months. There are reports that early last July, prior to the mass firings, the chief of the Rocket Force’s Third Department committed suicide, by hanging.
At the same time, it appears Xi Jinping is generally purging officers opposed to war, Former air force general Liu Yazhou, a prominent military thinker, received a death sentence in February 2022 – revealed only last year – reportedly for outspoken opposition to an invasion of Taiwan.
Apparently, the chiefs of the largest state military contractors have their heads on the chopping block too. Three of them were removed from China’s top advisory organ, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, in December.
And then there is the recent case of the last defense minister, General Li Shangfu. He was last seen in public August 29 and was formally sacked October 24. His replacement was named only on December 29. The long and unexplained intervals suggest a long period of internal wrangling.
The official explanation of events in the past months is that Xi Jinping is ridding the military of “corrupt” officers. Yes, the officers removed are undoubtedly corrupt, but so are many if not most of the remaining generals and admirals. In general, “corruption” campaigns in Communist China – especially those directed against senior figures – are straight-out political purges.
What’s going on in the Rocket Force? There are various theories. Xi Jinping could be installing officers who he believes will obey his orders to launch; Xi’s handpicked men are being purged by his opponents; or Xi is becoming paranoid and, Stalin-like, is replacing his own people at a fast clip. There are no good implications for any of these theories.
James Fanell, co-author of the upcoming Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure, told The Telegraph that the PLA is fit to fight, pointing out, among other things, that the Rocket Force has been successfully firing missiles at various targets like Taiwan and moving ships off Hainan Island. “For decades,” he said, “the US intelligence community and Defense Department have consistently underestimated the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army and its intentions, whether denying the Chinese navy would pursue aircraft carriers 30 years ago or today’s assertions that the PLA is not combat capable because of so-called ‘purges’ of officers.”
So do all the disappearances, removals, and firings affect the ability of the PLA to go to war?
Short answer: We can only guess. Outsiders have less and less visibility inside the Chinese regime as it closes itself off from the rest of the world. Common sense, however, says the rapid replacement of officers has to be degrading readiness. At this moment, generals and admirals are undoubtedly paying at least as much attention to their personal enemies in their own ranks as to China’s.
This churning – there are hints that the turnover will continue at least for another half year – suggests Xi Jinping is not confident that the military is ready to fight. This is not to say, however, that China will not end up in a war.
“China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Xi declared in a paragraph that appears to list what will happen this year. Whatever his actual intentions, China’s aggressive leader is creating markers by which his many – and growing number of – political enemies will judge him by. There seems to be an irresistible momentum to war inside the Chinese regime.
For many, great-power conflict is inconceivable. That, however, brings to mind Enoch Powell. Said the British politician, “History is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen.”
Over the last four years, there have been a series of clashes between the ground forces of the People’s Liberation Army and India’s defenders in the Himalayas. Despite substantial logistical and other material advantages, Chinese soldiers have performed poorly in combat.
The ground forces are unlikely to lead actions against the likely targets of Taiwan, the Philippines, or Japan, but the unexpectedly bad performance in the Himalayas raises a critical question: can the world’s largest military, China’s PLA, win wars?
As an initial matter, it’s evident that the leadership of the Chinese military is in turmoil.
Turmoil is the almost inevitable result of the PLA reporting to the Communist Party of China, through the Party’s Central Military Commission. Its status as a party army means the Chinese officer corps is even less professional than counterparts in most other countries.
The political masters of the PLA have been especially vigilant in exerting control after Marshall Lin Biao’s attempted coup against Mao Zedong in 1971. “The Party commands the gun,” Mao’s phrase, or similar statements are often seen in official pronouncements. There are, as in many militaries in communist states, two reporting lines in China, and the political one is more important than the military chain of command.
Politics are now consuming China’s senior officers. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post reported at the end of last month that five current or former commanders of the Rocket Force were removed from both the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and from China’s top legislative body itself.
Last year, the top two officers of the Rocket Force, which controls almost all of China’s nuclear weapons, were replaced. At least 70 in that branch have disappeared in recent months. There are reports that early last July, prior to the mass firings, the chief of the Rocket Force’s Third Department committed suicide, by hanging.
At the same time, it appears Xi Jinping is generally purging officers opposed to war, Former air force general Liu Yazhou, a prominent military thinker, received a death sentence in February 2022 – revealed only last year – reportedly for outspoken opposition to an invasion of Taiwan.
Apparently, the chiefs of the largest state military contractors have their heads on the chopping block too. Three of them were removed from China’s top advisory organ, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, in December.
And then there is the recent case of the last defense minister, General Li Shangfu. He was last seen in public August 29 and was formally sacked October 24. His replacement was named only on December 29. The long and unexplained intervals suggest a long period of internal wrangling.
The official explanation of events in the past months is that Xi Jinping is ridding the military of “corrupt” officers. Yes, the officers removed are undoubtedly corrupt, but so are many if not most of the remaining generals and admirals. In general, “corruption” campaigns in Communist China – especially those directed against senior figures – are straight-out political purges.
What’s going on in the Rocket Force? There are various theories. Xi Jinping could be installing officers who he believes will obey his orders to launch; Xi’s handpicked men are being purged by his opponents; or Xi is becoming paranoid and, Stalin-like, is replacing his own people at a fast clip. There are no good implications for any of these theories.
James Fanell, co-author of the upcoming Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure, told The Telegraph that the PLA is fit to fight, pointing out, among other things, that the Rocket Force has been successfully firing missiles at various targets like Taiwan and moving ships off Hainan Island. “For decades,” he said, “the US intelligence community and Defense Department have consistently underestimated the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army and its intentions, whether denying the Chinese navy would pursue aircraft carriers 30 years ago or today’s assertions that the PLA is not combat capable because of so-called ‘purges’ of officers.”
So do all the disappearances, removals, and firings affect the ability of the PLA to go to war?
Short answer: We can only guess. Outsiders have less and less visibility inside the Chinese regime as it closes itself off from the rest of the world. Common sense, however, says the rapid replacement of officers has to be degrading readiness. At this moment, generals and admirals are undoubtedly paying at least as much attention to their personal enemies in their own ranks as to China’s.
This churning – there are hints that the turnover will continue at least for another half year – suggests Xi Jinping is not confident that the military is ready to fight. This is not to say, however, that China will not end up in a war.
“China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Xi declared in a paragraph that appears to list what will happen this year. Whatever his actual intentions, China’s aggressive leader is creating markers by which his many – and growing number of – political enemies will judge him by. There seems to be an irresistible momentum to war inside the Chinese regime.
For many, great-power conflict is inconceivable. That, however, brings to mind Enoch Powell. Said the British politician, “History is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen.”