Many Taiwanese identify themselves as the “Orphan of Asia,” not only due to the island nation’s long history of being ruled by foreign rulers but also because of its lack of assured security. Like the archetypal orphan of Jungian psychology, many Taiwanese people are haunted by feelings of detachment, insecurity, and distrust toward others and yearn for a stronger security commitment from the United States. Meanwhile, the prevalent sense of doubt or skepticism regarding the dedication to defending the island persists. If left unchecked, these narratives could undermine the relationship between Taiwan and the United States and imperil the strategic unity of Indo-Pacific democracies–a situation that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would no doubt exploit.
In essence, skepticism of the commitment to Taiwan’s defense centers around the perception of three key factors: the perceived balance of power between Washington and Beijing, the perceived level of American commitment, and the perceived image of the United States as a great power. These perceptions are just that, and they do not necessarily stem from concrete realities. Thus, Beijing intends to manipulate the Taiwanese populace’s perception by fostering the belief in Chinese omnipotence: the island is indefensible, America is unreliable, and unification is inevitable.
A Capability Gap
China once basked in its status as a “rising great power,” enjoying impressive economic growth after the 2008 Beijing Olympics and its robust rebound from the global financial crisis. However, the conviction that China could replace the United States as the world’s next hegemon seems to have waned compared to the triumphalist fervor of a decade ago. According to 2023 global surveys by the Pew Research Center, this shift in sentiment results from several factors: China’s aging population, inefficient and ideology-driven economic policy, the trade war and technology sanctions, and the far-reaching economic repercussions of the pandemic shutdown.
Nonetheless, China’s ongoing military expansion continues to trigger apprehension within Taiwan, other Indo-Pacific nations, and the United States. Theories abound about a potential superpower clash and the potential emergence of a Chinese-dominated international order. Two competing viewpoints, Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” and Hal Brands and Michael Beckley’s “Peaking Power Trap,” have engendered fervent debates.
Allison posits that the current U.S.-China competition, like most historical instances of hegemonic transitions in modern history, could escalate into a great power conflict. On the other hand, Brands and Beckley contend that as China’s economic and demographic outlook prematurely peaks, the likelihood of successfully displacing U.S. supremacy diminishes. Should this scenario unfold, China may challenge the United States at a juncture when its prospects are most favorable. In either scenario, be it the “Thucydides Trap” or the “Peaking Power Trap,” a war involving Taiwan would inevitably serve as a litmus test for China’s ambition to challenge American hegemony.
For many skeptics in Taiwan, the hegemonic decline of the United States is evident in its inglorious exit from Afghanistan and its reluctance to intervene decisively in the Russia-Ukraine War. Islanders interpret these events as foreshadowing the eventual American failure to confront China on behalf of Taiwan. Adding to this perspective, certain theorists suggest that Washington views Taipei as a strategic pawn, using it to contain China by inciting a cross-strait war before consolidating its position as the world’s sole superpower.
A Credibility Gap
In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the United States’ capability to deter a potential Chinese invasion in Taiwan, a prevalent distrust towards the defense commitment endures. This sentiment partially results from the island’s historical experiences of feeling “abandoned” by its rulers and allies, whether the Dutch, Chinese, or Japanese.
However, the history of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s former ruling party, adds a profound layer to this collective memory. Since its inception, the KMT in China has shifted alliances among major powers such as Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the United States, all in pursuit of a more powerful and supportive ally. More often than not, divergent foreign policies characterized these relationships. After the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War and resettlement in Taiwan in 1949, the KMT witnessed the rapprochement between Nixon and Mao in the 1970s, precipitating Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation.
Another source of distrust stems from the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” in which the United States neither commits nor rules out defending Taiwan in the case of Chinese coercion. Unlike formal military alliances, such as NATO, where the principle of collective defense binds members together, Taiwan is not a treaty ally. The shift of diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 further precluded an alliance.
Today, Taiwan may appear to possess a “rock-solid commitment” from the United States, underscored by President Joe Biden’s repeated affirmation of military support in the event of a Chinese. This commitment, however, remains verbal and has yet to materialize into a formal alliance or any substantial military deployment. Strategic ambiguity persists, leaving the Taiwanese people in suspense.
In addition to the historical perception of “abandonment” and the lack of strategic clarity, the Taiwanese are wary of the range of new ideas swirling in DC that may weaken commitment. For example, proponents of restraint, like Michael Swaine, advocate for reducing arms sales to Taiwan to de-escalate tensions with China. Charles Glaser even proposes a “Grand Bargain,” suggesting that Washington abandon Taipei in exchange for Beijing’s renunciation of military expansionism. Thinkers like Elbridge Colby highlight deficiencies in Taiwan’s military readiness and question America’s commitment if the islanders fail to take their own defense seriously. Furthermore, Corporate America, with its substantial economic stakes in China and pull in Washington, might lobby for closer U.S.-China ties or even suggest the incorporation of Taiwan into China, as Tesla CEO Elon Musk has done.
Specific discussions or proposals that might not be in the American mainstream can still resonate, especially among those interested in fostering distrust toward America. For instance, “detaiwanization” involves potentially relocating valuable assets, such as the island’s advanced semiconductor industry and highly skilled workforce. Another discussion revolves around the paranoid notion that the White House might consider “destroying Taiwan” or its key industries should China invade, minimizing any strategic gains China could reap upon capturing the island. Lastly, discussions about Taiwan’s final status can involve scenarios such as the issuance of a “Fourth U.S.-China Joint Communique” or the brokering of an “interim agreement” that imposes the Hong Kong model of “One Country, Two Systems” on Taiwan. None of these proposals involves meaningful Taiwanese participation or consent, and they fuel the chronic sense of grievance.
America’s Image
Some narratives revolve around America’s general image in the eyes of mainlanders and are not directly linked to the U.S. government’s statements and posture. Nonetheless, these images exacerbate existing doubts about American support for Taiwan. For instance, anti-imperialist narratives suggest that the United States exploits the island for its military, political, and economic interests. Taiwan’s military purchases and TSMC’s investment in Arizona, are seen as embodiments of American imperialist inclinations.
Some Chinese nationalists in Taiwan view themselves as victims of a “century of humiliation” engineered by Western powers. This anti-Americanism can be attributed to the United States’ hegemonic position, which perpetuates China’s inferior global standing and Taiwan’s separation from the “motherland.”
The United States also faces accusations of hypocrisy for proclaiming support for democracy and human rights while grappling with internal issues of minority discrimination and bolstering autocratic regimes abroad. These criticisms arise when Washington limits its engagement with Taipei to appease authoritarian China and when its officials reportedly take sides in Taiwan’s elections.
Finally, some voices advocate ending Taiwan’s status as an American subsidiary. Related proposals may involve concepts such as “strategic autonomy,” an “equal distance strategy” between the United States and China, or a declaration as a neutral state.
Defending Democracy?
As we delve into narratives that cultivate distrust towards the United States within Taiwanese society, it is also necessary to thoroughly analyze public opinion surveys. These surveys provide valuable insights into the events that could impact confidence in American commitment to a greater degree. For instance, the Taiwanese often gauge American reactions to conflicts elsewhere to indicate how it might respond to a potential cross-strait war. Public polls like the Taiwan National Security Survey have shown that the proportion of respondents who believed that the United States would intervene fluctuated between 40 percent and 60 percent over the past two decades. However, following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War last year, these numbers dropped from 65 percent in October 2021 to 34.5 percent in March 2022, according to the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation surveys. Moreover, the surveys by Academia Sinica’s American Portrait project indicate a decline in those who believed the United States is a credible country from 45.3 percent in 2021 to 34 percent in 2022. Such changes even coincided with President Biden’s reiterated commitment to the island’s defense.
Examining these surveys also provides insights into the factors that shape Taiwanese people’s perceptions of trust and distrust regarding U.S. commitment. In their eyes, the United States makes decisions based on its calculation of national interests rather than on an unwavering commitment to democracy. According to a 2019 survey by Academia Sinica’s China Image project, most respondents (53.3 percent) believed the United States would intervene militarily due to the island’s strategic location in the Asia-Pacific region. The survey also revealed that then-President Donald Trump’s assertive stance towards China (43.5 percent), American military superiority over China (40.1 percent), Taiwan’s role as a significant economic partner (36.1 percent), and shared democratic values (36 percent) were considered secondary reasons for the U.S. to defend Taiwan. In contrast, around one-third of respondents (34.2 percent) believed that Washington would not prioritize protecting democracy over its own interests. Over a quarter of respondents also cited the economic benefits the United States could obtain from China (28.7 percent) and President Trump’s unpredictable policies (26.8 percent) as notable reasons for the likelihood of no intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
