Lyndon Johnson apparently once quipped that a rival was so dumb, he “couldn’t chew gum and walk at the same time”. Ironically, Johnson found that America’s deeper entanglement in the Vietnam war overwhelmed his bandwidth, undermining his ability to multitask across domestic agenda and foreign policy. Today, with war in Gaza threatening to spill over into the region, impasse in Ukraine and governments struggling to tame inflation, the US-led Western alliance is fraying – struggling to cope with the geopolitical multitasking we face.
The evidence is not just Vladimir Putin’s rash invasion of Ukraine, which will require marathon levels of stamina in the Western supply of military hardware and cohesion if Volodymyr Zelensky is to prevail. Tyrants have been emboldened, with brutal dictators seizing power in Zimbabwe and Sudan. Nicolás Maduro – Hugo Chavez’s successor in Venezuela – persuaded the US to ease sanctions, on the promise of free elections next year. Yet, this week, a court stuffed with Maduro lackeys suspended the primary ballot organised to choose the opposition candidate.
Elsewhere, second order issues don’t get the attention they merit. There is little heavyweight diplomatic focus on the dangerous Serb-Albanian tensions in Kosovo, or the knife-edge run-off in the Argentine presidential elections, pitting a Peronist minister against an insurgent “anarcho-capitalist” – in the most consequential ballot there in years.
Even where Western capitals focus on a strategic challenge, such as China, they are easily distracted. For all the chest-beating by China hawks, there has been scant debate about Taiwan’s elections in January. And yet no single development will have more impact on the risk of war in Taiwan over the next four years – with all the global consequences that entails.
The traditional race between the hawkish pro-independence DPP and the pro-unification KMT could be upended if the KMT agrees a deal with the new Taiwan People’s Party, which touts a formula it says would enable engagement with China without prejudicing sovereignty. Whatever the wisdom of these positions – and mindful of the need to respect Taiwanese democracy – the Western stake in the outcome could not be greater, but is scarcely articulated.
This short concentration span reflects a changing world. The bipolar certainties and solidarity of the Cold War have been overtaken by a more multipolar, complex, and fragmented world. The rise of the East – led by China and India – has reduced the West’s relative power. Polarised domestic politics, from Washington to Bratislava, have reasserted a more hard-headed appraisal of national self-interest. Negotiations stumble on relatively straightforward challenges: the EU and Australia can’t even agree a free trade deal. Internationalism in foreign policy is inevitably being eclipsed by sharper realism across national capitals.
We have re-entered an era of “balance of power” geopolitics. But it is not the same as Henry Kissinger’s much touted pre-First World War paradigm. There are more international players in 2023 than there were in 1910. Governments have less reaction time in a digital world, while transnational threats, from pandemics to climate change, absorb attention.
Internationalists may balk at the implications, but they are unlikely to halt the tide of more realist foreign policy – on all sides. The US, whether Biden or Trump wins in 2024, is likely to become even less interventionist, and more resentful of European free-riding under America’s security umbrella. The EU will hanker for more strategic autonomy, but governments will deny Brussels the means.
The supply of arms to Ukraine is unlikely to match demand, leaving an attritional stalemate. While appalling in humanitarian terms, it may blunt Putin’s capacity for mischief-making elsewhere. China, too, will find its international ambitions, from Belt and Road to the reunification of Taiwan, constrained by stalling economic performance and rumbling social discontent.
This changing kaleidoscope also creates opportunities for mid-sized nations. Whether it is peace-making and investment in East Africa, trade and maritime cooperation in South East Asia, or the supply chains for critical minerals in South America, the UK can advance its interests if we adapt and align in agile clusters with like-minded countries.
An emphasis on pragmatism will eclipse virtue-signalling tweets. Citizens and investors will see through cliché-coated press releases. If rational heads prevail, the world may just find this reckoning with realism leads to a period of greater stability.
Dominic Raab MP is a former foreign secretary and deputy prime minister
Lyndon Johnson apparently once quipped that a rival was so dumb, he “couldn’t chew gum and walk at the same time”. Ironically, Johnson found that America’s deeper entanglement in the Vietnam war overwhelmed his bandwidth, undermining his ability to multitask across domestic agenda and foreign policy. Today, with war in Gaza threatening to spill over into the region, impasse in Ukraine and governments struggling to tame inflation, the US-led Western alliance is fraying – struggling to cope with the geopolitical multitasking we face.
The evidence is not just Vladimir Putin’s rash invasion of Ukraine, which will require marathon levels of stamina in the Western supply of military hardware and cohesion if Volodymyr Zelensky is to prevail. Tyrants have been emboldened, with brutal dictators seizing power in Zimbabwe and Sudan. Nicolás Maduro – Hugo Chavez’s successor in Venezuela – persuaded the US to ease sanctions, on the promise of free elections next year. Yet, this week, a court stuffed with Maduro lackeys suspended the primary ballot organised to choose the opposition candidate.
Elsewhere, second order issues don’t get the attention they merit. There is little heavyweight diplomatic focus on the dangerous Serb-Albanian tensions in Kosovo, or the knife-edge run-off in the Argentine presidential elections, pitting a Peronist minister against an insurgent “anarcho-capitalist” – in the most consequential ballot there in years.
Even where Western capitals focus on a strategic challenge, such as China, they are easily distracted. For all the chest-beating by China hawks, there has been scant debate about Taiwan’s elections in January. And yet no single development will have more impact on the risk of war in Taiwan over the next four years – with all the global consequences that entails.
The traditional race between the hawkish pro-independence DPP and the pro-unification KMT could be upended if the KMT agrees a deal with the new Taiwan People’s Party, which touts a formula it says would enable engagement with China without prejudicing sovereignty. Whatever the wisdom of these positions – and mindful of the need to respect Taiwanese democracy – the Western stake in the outcome could not be greater, but is scarcely articulated.
This short concentration span reflects a changing world. The bipolar certainties and solidarity of the Cold War have been overtaken by a more multipolar, complex, and fragmented world. The rise of the East – led by China and India – has reduced the West’s relative power. Polarised domestic politics, from Washington to Bratislava, have reasserted a more hard-headed appraisal of national self-interest. Negotiations stumble on relatively straightforward challenges: the EU and Australia can’t even agree a free trade deal. Internationalism in foreign policy is inevitably being eclipsed by sharper realism across national capitals.
We have re-entered an era of “balance of power” geopolitics. But it is not the same as Henry Kissinger’s much touted pre-First World War paradigm. There are more international players in 2023 than there were in 1910. Governments have less reaction time in a digital world, while transnational threats, from pandemics to climate change, absorb attention.
Internationalists may balk at the implications, but they are unlikely to halt the tide of more realist foreign policy – on all sides. The US, whether Biden or Trump wins in 2024, is likely to become even less interventionist, and more resentful of European free-riding under America’s security umbrella. The EU will hanker for more strategic autonomy, but governments will deny Brussels the means.
The supply of arms to Ukraine is unlikely to match demand, leaving an attritional stalemate. While appalling in humanitarian terms, it may blunt Putin’s capacity for mischief-making elsewhere. China, too, will find its international ambitions, from Belt and Road to the reunification of Taiwan, constrained by stalling economic performance and rumbling social discontent.
This changing kaleidoscope also creates opportunities for mid-sized nations. Whether it is peace-making and investment in East Africa, trade and maritime cooperation in South East Asia, or the supply chains for critical minerals in South America, the UK can advance its interests if we adapt and align in agile clusters with like-minded countries.
An emphasis on pragmatism will eclipse virtue-signalling tweets. Citizens and investors will see through cliché-coated press releases. If rational heads prevail, the world may just find this reckoning with realism leads to a period of greater stability.
Dominic Raab MP is a former foreign secretary and deputy prime minister