Written by Chia-hung Tsai.
Image Credit: 2024-01-13 20.48.23 by albyantoniazzi/ Flickr: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED.
Taiwan’s 2024 presidential and legislative elections, held on 13 January, concluded peacefully, revealing key insights into the electorate’s priorities. The results highlight that voters are influenced by both their sense of Taiwanese/Chinese identity, especially in the context of cross-strait relations, and their pragmatic concerns for personal, tangible interests, for instance, low income, high inflation, high unemployment rate and unaffordable housing prices for average middle class in Taiwan. These transcend ideological or identity boundaries. The dual factors set the stage for the critical governance issues and candidate personalities that defined the election.
First of all, the public’s dissatisfaction with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is evident. While the DPP contends that many criticisms from opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), are unjust or misleading, the general discontent over issues like high housing prices, low wages, and various scandals—ranging from thesis plagiarism to sexual harassment, and industrial waste issues in Tainan farmlands—cannot be overlooked. The DPP’s similar vote shares in the 2022 local elections (41.6%) and the recent presidential election (40.1%) indicate that the public perceives little improvement under the DPP governance.
Certainly, the DPP government is proud of its economic numbers, especially during the pandemic. Additionally, regarding the issues and criticism of social welfare, it is arguable that it may take quite a long time to develop a robust social welfare system since economic development is the prerequisite for redistributive policies. Thus, social welfare requires sound economic growth. However, the electorate expects to see more actions to reduce the disparity in spite of economic development. The difference between satisfaction with democracy and belief in democracy is a very challenging problem for every democratic country to address. Taiwan is no exception.
This election also highlights the diversity of public opinion. While the DPP and KMT acknowledged that the status quo is the consensus, the KMT suggests that a warmer relationship between Taiwan and China should be the priority. The DPP also pledges to improve cross-strait relations, but it fails to offer any clear plan to approach China without accepting the “1992 Consensus“ that is close to “one China policy.” The TPP argues that both the KMT and DPP are not effectively addressing cross-strait relations, positioning itself as a viable mediator between China and the United States. However, the TPP’s exact stance on cross-strait relations remains somewhat ambiguous. It seems that those who voted for the TPP are less concerned about China’s economic sanctions and military coercion. For TPP supporters, maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations, rather than moving towards the 1992 Consensus, is currently acceptable. They are open to new approaches in cross-strait policy as long as these do not introduce significant risks. This suggests a need for the new government to be more inclusive and flexible in responding to changing public opinions on these issues.
It is worth noting that the DPP won the unprecedented three presidential elections in a row. While opposition parties called for party change and indeed received sixty per cent of votes together, the DPP still survived the close race. Certainly, the new government does not have too much political capital to waste. It has no room for any mistakes from Day 1. After maintaining the constituent and party-list seats, the KMT is in an excellent position to win the upcoming local election, which proved to be critical to national elections. However, the KMT has to consider the extent to which Chinese identity can appeal to younger people.
Moreover, the KMT won many districts by a small margin. The TPP may help some KMT candidates win the 2024 district-level legislative election. As for the TPP, their district-level candidates only receive around 3 per cent of votes, which is far below the TPP’s vote share in the presidential election. The TPP has to answer the question of why it cannot find strong candidates in the district-level election.
This election also showed a pronounced geographical divide in Taiwan. The southern region remained a stronghold for the DPP, consistently supporting them in both presidential and district-level legislative elections. However, the party faced a significant loss of seats in central Taiwan. In northern Taiwan, the losses for the DPP were greater than anticipated. These outcomes suggest the DPP’s ongoing struggle to dissolve local factions in central Taiwan and its failure to directly distribute benefits to the populace, bypassing local government intermediaries. From the KMT’s perspective, there is a perception that the DPP predominantly rewards southern Taiwan for its longstanding support. This overlooks crucial needs in northern and central Taiwan, areas rich in high-tech industries, where there are acute shortages of skilled labour, electricity, land, and water – issues the DPP government has not fully addressed. The TPP appeals to workers in these high-tech sectors, offering a fresh and pragmatic approach. TPP chairman Ko Wen-je, a medical doctor, embodies professionalism and pragmatism, resonating with these voters.
Furthermore, the DPP’s loss in the 2022 local elections in Taichung and Taoyuan is telling. The former mayors of these cities joined the cabinet rather than remaining with their local support base, a move that might have adverse repercussions for the DPP following this election. Overall, the TPP indeed ran a successful campaign. In four years, they gained three more party-list seats and won 26 per cent in the presidential election. It is believed that many younger people switched from the DPP to the TPP. One of the biggest differences between the DPP, KMT, and TPP is that the TPP has never been organised yet. The TPP is an anti-establishment movement rather than a young party. For example, it does not have a party platform but a set of core principles. The TPP also recruited many former DPP, New Power Party, and KMT members. It will be interesting to explore whether younger people still follow the TPP after it gradually enlarges and enters into the political system. In other words, the TPP has to find the balance between inclusiveness and discipline if it wants to move forward.
In conclusion, despite securing the presidency, the DPP emerges as the greatest loser. The DPP must introspect on its stagnation since the 2022 local elections and even more so since the 2020 presidential election. Conversely, the true victor is Taiwan’s democracy. Faced with the constant threat from China, the Taiwanese people have remained resolute. Notably, all candidates maintained the fairness and integrity of the election process. Even in a climate of deep political polarisation, this election reaffirms democracy as a shared value in Taiwan. The critical question now is whether each political party can be more attuned to the public’s needs and effectively counter China’s influence in the foreseeable future.
Dr Chia-hung Tsai is a Research Fellow at the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University. He holds a joint appointment with the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies. His most recent publication is “Foreign Policy Orientation with Party Cues” on Asian Survey. Dr. Tsai holds a doctorate in political science from the Ohio State University. He was also a recipient of a visiting scholarship of Top University Alliance (2012-2013) and a recipient of Taiwan’s 2022-2023 senior Fulbright Research Grants.
This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘What does the 2024 Taiwan election tell us?’.
