During Chen Shui-bian’s second term as Taiwan president, Chen’s radical pursuit of de jure independence for Taiwan led to the Taiwan Strait becoming at risk of war. Worried that the US might get embroiled in conflict, the George W. Bush administration stressed that it was against Chen’s risky moves to use radical Taiwan independence to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait.
Changing the rhetoric
The US government labelled Chen a “troublemaker”, and they and the mainland goverment worked to “collectively manage A-Bian”. This was also a key reason why the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost the 2008 election. This became a nightmare scenario that subsequent DPP presidential candidates sought to avoid.
The Bush administration at the time was extremely Taiwan-friendly and anti-China. Besides not wanting to be dragged into war because of Chen, the US switched their stance because the mainland Chinese government proactively aligned itself with the Bush administration’s strategic shifts following the September 11 terror attacks, showing support for the US’s global war against terrorism.
Due to common interests in the Taiwan Strait and the world, China and the US were spurred to cooperate on the Taiwan issue, collectively preventing the Taiwan Strait from being mired in military conflict. Cross-strait relations improved greatly after 2008, and the US viewed this development very positively, showing approval for then President Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-strait policy.
Even up till just before the 2012 election in Taiwan, the trouble caused by Chen was still a fresh memory for the US, and it was worried that then DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen could become a second Chen Shui-bian. This was a major reason why Tsai replaced the “seeking de jure Taiwan independence” rhetoric on cross-strait relations with “safeguarding Taiwan’s de facto independence”.
… once Lai became the DPP’s presidential candidate, there were signs of both China and the US “collectively managing” a radical Taiwan independence, albeit not as overt a collaboration as it was in the past.
Taiwan presidential candidate Lai Ching-te (left) and his running mate Hsiao Bi-khim (right), from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), display a document at the Central Elections Committee after they registered running for the 2024 presidential elections in Taipei on 21 November 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP)
On the brink of the 2024 election, cross-strait relations and China-US relations have now become a point of contention. Taiwan’s strategic value to the US is at a relative high, and the Taiwan issue has become a powder keg for China-US relations. Under such circumstances, would it be a fool’s notion to consider whether the US and mainland China would collectively manage the radical Taiwan independence efforts of William Lai, potentially the next Taiwan president, the way they had done so for A-Bian?
‘Collective management’ for a common goal
In fact, once Lai became the DPP’s presidential candidate, there were signs of both China and the US “collectively managing” a radical Taiwan independence, albeit not as overt a collaboration as it was in the past. Both sides are worried that, as a key political figure pushing for a radical Taiwan independence and Taiwan’s de jure independence, Lai could become a second Chen Shui-bian. Lai’s public statements denoting his will for Taiwan independence while serving as premier, vice-president and presidential candidate has greatly heightened doubts towards him from both China and the US.
In order to suppress his will for Taiwan independence, the mainland Chinese government has denied Lai the opportunity to be “tested”, and so there is no issue of whether his “answer sheet” is satisfactory. They have thus closed the book on Lai at an early stage — an even harsher and stronger-handed approach than was meted to Tsai when she first took office. The mainland government has long blacklisted Lai as a “troublemaker” and is attempting to warn the US government that Lai would bring great trouble to the US as well.
Indeed, the US government is particularly concerned with some of Lai’s remarks on Taiwan independence and hopes that he will be careful with his words and actions. The US even received him in a low-key manner during his stopover so as not to spur his tendency towards Taiwan independence.
As long as the US is unable to trust Lai as much as Tsai, the mainland will have the opportunity to continue cooperating with the US and co-manage Lai’s tendency towards radical Taiwan independence.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen waves next to Taiwan Vice-President William Lai and Taiwan Parliament Speaker You Si-kun, during the Double Tenth Day celebration ceremony in Taipei, Taiwan, on 10 October 2023. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)
Recently, three influential American academics urged the mainland, the US and Taiwan to offer one another credible assurances, and even prompted the DPP (Lai) to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter as a credible assurance to the mainland.
Neither the mainland nor the US wants to see the next Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan and have thus issued a warning to Lai. This is actually a form of “collective management” for a common goal, and the foundation for further collective management in the future.
Clearly, Lai has received both warnings from the mainland and the US and adjusted his stance in a timely manner. He is attempting to show the mainland, the US and Taiwanese voters that in terms of cross-strait policy, he will be the next Tsai Ing-wen and not Chen Shui-bian, and that there will be no military conflict on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
However, the mainland is not buying it, while the US is unsure. As long as the US is unable to trust Lai as much as Tsai, the mainland will have the opportunity to continue cooperating with the US and co-manage Lai’s tendency towards radical Taiwan independence.
Largest common denominator
The period between the presidential election next year and the inauguration of the new Taiwan president will be a crucial one for the mainland, the US and Taiwan. If Lai is elected president, based on the mainland’s traditional thinking, it would immediately pressure him through various means to ensure that he does not say anything that would challenge Beijing’s bottom lines in his inaugural speech.
… collectively managing the prospect of a radical Taiwan independence can build mutual trust between the mainland and the US and is conducive to the continued improvement of China-US relations.
Taiwan presidential candidate William Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), speaks to supporters outside the Central Elections Committee after he registered running for the 2024 presidential elections in Taipei, Taiwan, on 21 November 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP)
But such moves will most likely affect the recent warming in China-US ties and force the US to reaffirm its support for Lai again. With the US’s support, Lai could adopt a confrontational approach to the island’s China policy, which would ultimately trap the mainland, the US and Taiwan in a vicious circle again.
Regardless of whether Beijing or Washington takes the initiative, will both parties be able to use specific channels to discuss the possibility of collectively managing the prospect of a radical Taiwan independence after 2024?
The mainland could present various types of evidence to prove that the scenario of a radical Taiwan independence after 2024 would be dangerous and persuade the US to collectively manage such an outcome together.
If the US agrees to manage the situation together, the mainland could soften its harsh stance before the new Taiwan president is inaugurated. This would allow the US more space to exert its influence over the new president’s actions. Indeed, collectively managing the prospect of a radical Taiwan independence can build mutual trust between the mainland and the US and is conducive to the continued improvement of China-US relations.
Taiwanese soldiers demonstrate their combat skills during a military open house event in Hsinchu, Taiwan on 21 September 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP)
Even in the case of collective management, it is impossible for the US to disregard Taiwan’s interests. The new Taiwan government could also indirectly communicate with the mainland through the US to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait as much as possible.
At the end of the day, peace in the Taiwan Strait is the largest common denominator for the mainland, the US and Taiwan, and it is necessary for the three parties to collectively manage the situation together.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中美共管激进台独？”.
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