China is intently observing the Ukraine war, drawing lessons from the ongoing conflict pitting Russia versus the West in a proxy theater for a possible protracted war over Taiwan.
This month, Business Insider reported that China may be preparing for a drawn-out war after witnessing Russia’s protracted conflict in Ukraine, citing an International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank assessment. That may mean focusing more on its reservists and reexamining operational plans for long-term industrial and logistic sustainment.
The Business Insider report notes that China’s military recruitment regulations passed in 2023 empowered China’s leaders to tweak the terms and conditions of military recruitment during the war and recall veterans to service.
It notes that heavy losses in Ukraine and reports of mistreatment of conscripts and contract soldiers have been stumbling blocks for Russian military recruitment.
Business Insider says that China’s new recruitment measures may indicate it is considering the likelihood of a similarly slow, plodding war in the Indo-Pacific as it may not achieve the short, quick, swift victory afforded by a surprise attack some analysts are predicting.
Early in the Ukraine war, Russia attempted to seize Kiev with a blitzkrieg, which failed due to the lack of surprise, Russia’s military mistakes, under-preparedness and Ukrainian resistance. Subsequently, the war has turned into a World War I-style attrition, with horrific material and human costs.
In estimating China’s possible timeframe for a Taiwan conflict, Timothy Heath and other writers note in a June 2023 RAND analysis that Taiwan is most vulnerable to defeat in the first 90 days of a Chinese invasion.
Heath and others mention that due to Taiwan’s military disadvantages and low durability, a US intervention would be required to repel a Chinese invasion within that timeframe. Without a US intervention, they note that China’s overwhelming military resources would likely allow it to subjugate the self-governing island Beijing considers a renegade province.
People’s Liberation Army amphibious tanks assault a beach during an exercise conducted on an island off the southeastern province of Fujian across from Taiwan in a file photo. Image: Photo: Xinhua
Asia Times noted in October 2023 that, at the minimum, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might need to land 300,000 to 400,000 troops in Taiwan to quickly seize the island, following swift and sharp air and missile decapitation strikes that aim to take out Taiwan’s civilian and military leadership.
But should that fail, the PLA may have to send as many as 2 million troops to Taiwan, including police and paramilitary personnel, to ensure a three-to-one or five-to-one numerical superiority against the defender.
However, China’s manpower woes may make raising such a force extremely challenging in recruiting highly skilled, psychologically and physically fit soldiers.
Task and Purpose, in a video this month, notes that as the PLA modernizes its equipment, it will need highly educated, technologically savvy personnel to operate it.
However, it mentions Chinese cultural views of the military as a lowly career, high emigration from China, increasing physical and psychological conditions among potential recruits, corruption in the PLA, the long-term impact of the One Child Policy and the perceived hardships of military life over a lucrative civilian career all contribute to China’s military manpower shortage.
Task and Purpose notes that the PLA needs to find ways to make a military career appealing to younger Chinese, offering skills and opportunities that could be used outside the military and ensuring competitive salaries.
While the Ukraine war has decimated Russia’s tank fleet, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds mention for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) this month that Russia has ramped up tank production to 1,500 units per year by increasing factory work shifts and reactivating previously mothballed production facilities.
However, Watling and Reynolds say that 80% of those tanks are refurbished from older war stocks and that while Russia can maintain a stable production rate through 2024, it will find that most vehicles will require deeper refurbishment in 2025 and will have exhausted most of its available stocks by 2026.
China may note those lessons in its shipbuilding industry as it may face heavy warship losses in a Taiwan scenario. The US 2023 China Military Power Report mentions that the PLA-Navy (PLA-N) is the largest navy in the world, with 370 ships and submarines including 138 major surface combatants.
In January 2023, Asia Times reported on a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report wargaming a 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan, wherein China lost 138 ships, 155 combat aircraft and 52,000 ground troops.
Despite those high potential losses, China’s shipbuilding industry appears primed for a war of attrition. Niharika Mandhana mentions in a Wall Street Journal this month that more than half of the world’s commercial shipbuilding output came from China last year, with Europe contributing just 5% of global production and the US contributing next to nothing.
Mandhana notes that China’s shipbuilding industry benefits from a massive commercial workload, enabling it to quickly build new ships and repair battle-damaged ones when sized to wartime production rates.
Dominic Nicholls points out in an April 2021 article for The Telegraph that, since 2014, China has been cranking out more submarines, warships, amphibious assault ships and auxiliaries than the total number of vessels in the British, German, Spanish, and Taiwanese navies. Nicholls adds that every four years China adds the equivalent of the Royal Navy to its fleet in tonnage.
China’s shipbuilding capacity is unrivaled worldwide. Image: Facebook Screengrab
In February 2023, Asia Times pointed out China’s shipbuilding lead over the US, with each of China’s 13 naval shipyards having more capacity than all seven US naval shipyards combined. Budget cuts in the US have resulted in layoffs of skilled workers whose skills could not be easily replaced.
The lack of new shipbuilding facilities has also resulted in US warships staying longer in shipyards for repairs, giving little incentive for shipyards to increase production capacity, resulting in the loss of skilled workers, technical know-how and subcontractors.
Despite that numerical and production advantage, Justin Katz says in an article this month for Breaking Defense that it’s not all about numbers, stressing that the US Navy is part of a larger ecosystem, highlighting platforms across multiple domains, networks, cyberspace and space-based assets, emphasizing that it is the joint force that enables the US Navy.
However, Asia Times noted in January 2024 that numerical superiority often trumps short-lived technological advantages, with 25 out of 28 naval wars from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War being won by superior fleet numbers, with only three won out of technological advantage.
