By Antonio Graceffo
Last month, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and naval vessels threatened the sea and airspace around Taiwan, shortly after Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) unveiled his plan for economic integration with Taiwan. This development raises concerns, especially considering that just a year ago, during the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi made a startling declaration by not ruling out the possibility of employing force to bring Taiwan under Chinese control. His stated priority, that “Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment,” has been interpreted as suggesting a sense of urgency.
Some experts believe that Xi aims to take Taiwan by 2027, which marks the 100th anniversary of the PLA. Others think that Taiwan will be a part of Xi’s 2049 objectives, aligning with the centennial anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Another perspective is that he would refrain from invasion until he deems his country economically or militarily formidable enough to potentially wage war with the US and its allies. Some also note that in 2049, Xi will be 96 years old and unlikely to still be the CCP chairman.
The pivotal question revolves around whether Xi has established a clear timetable for a potential Taiwan invasion and, if so, when this might occur.
On Oct. 5, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) — a distinguished US think tank specializing in national security and global politics — convened its annual China Power Conference in Washington under the theme “Does Xi Jinping Have a Timeline for Taiwan?” This conference assembled prominent experts from the US government and leading think tanks.
German Marshall Fund Indo-Pacific Program managing director Bonnie Glaser made a noteworthy observation. She said that documents from as early as the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1997 have consistently emphasized that the Taiwan issue and “reunification” is a state priority, namely “Party leadership, the forces to be relied on, and the reunification of the motherland.” Glaser’s point was that Chinese leaders since the 1990s have underscored the importance of Taiwan, subtly implying that it should ideally be resolved by 2049. Consequently, she opined that no fixed date may have been set for a Taiwan invasion, and resolving this issue may not necessarily carry greater urgency for Xi than for his predecessors.
Another speaker, Institute for Defense Analysis researcher and former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for China Chad Sbragia, concurred that there appeared to be no predetermined date for a potential invasion.
Furthermore, he stressed that Xi’s decision regarding a Taiwan invasion is unlikely to hinge solely on the prospect of a conflict with the US and its potential outcome. Instead, Sbragia emphasized, Xi’s deliberations would encompass a broad array of contextual factors, including assessments of military and economic capabilities, and the feasibility of achieving success.
Having considered the insights shared by experts at the China Power Conference, it is worth offering a personal perspective on the matter. In my analysis, it appears that Xi might bide his time until China reaches a level of military and economic preparedness that aligns with his ambitions.
Xi, who aspires to be remembered alongside Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) as a paramount leader in Chinese history, recognizes the necessity of a significant and history-altering achievement.
It is evident that merely overseeing gradual economic improvements might not suffice to secure his legacy, especially at a time when the Chinese economy faces challenges. His recent shift from prioritizing the economy to prioritizing social controls may signal that he understands that he cannot bring about an economic miracle of epic proportions.
Therefore, Xi might be looking for some other great achievement to immortalize his name. Colonizing the moon might be impossible, and landing humans on Mars, while remarkable, might not be enough. Capturing Taiwan could be the feat that would etch his name in stone.
Moving too early could be disastrous. Attempting to take Taiwan and failing would be destructive for Xi and for the CCP. This also means that Xi must be prepared for war with the US.
While the Taiwan Relations Act maintains a level of strategic ambiguity, refraining from a definitive commitment to US military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf, numerous experts say that the US would indeed step in if necessary. US President Joe Biden has made this clear on four separate occasions, underscoring the US commitment to safeguarding Taiwan. This stance aligns with the views of authoritative bodies such as the House Armed Services Committee, recognizing the pivotal role of a free Taiwan in preserving the vital freedom of navigation within the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region. As a result, safeguarding Taiwan’s security interests directly aligns with US national security priorities.
Furthermore, the US has cultivated regional alliances with nations like Japan and Southeast Asian countries with stakes in the South China Sea, where freedom of navigation is a shared concern. In the event of a conflict, these nations could potentially join efforts to maintain open maritime routes. For this reason, any preparations for a potential PRC invasion of Taiwan are indicative of readiness for a large-scale war.
China, as a net importer of food and energy resources, faces vulnerability in the event of a conflict. As soon as a war starts, the US Seventh Fleet would cut off shipments to the PRC. There might still be the possibility of transporting energy sources overland, for example through Russia’s Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, slated to be completed by 2030.
Yet, even if Beijing could redirect imports overland through Russia and Central Asia, China would lose its ability to export goods around the world, negatively impacting its economy for the duration of the war and possibly longer. Consequently, China would have to plan carefully.
Glaser introduced a significant twist to the theory that Xi would only act when China is fully prepared. She pointed out the possibility that Xi might act pre-emptively if he believes there is a risk of permanent Taiwan separation. Factors that could trigger such action include shifts in US policy, formal recognition of Taiwan by a major international power, or a pathway to recognition facilitated by organizations like the UN or the global community. A major global policy shift could indeed be a catalyst for Xi’s decision. Moreover, it is essential to consider that if Xi perceives threats to his leadership, he might react by attacking Taiwan as a means to securing both his position and legacy.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China-MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
Comments will be moderated. Keep comments relevant to the article. Remarks containing abusive and obscene language, personal attacks of any kind or promotion will be removed and the user banned. Final decision will be at the discretion of the Taipei Times.
